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THE SENTENCING BOOMERANG: DRUG PROHIBITION
POLITICS AND REFORM
ERIC E. STERLING*
I. INTRODUCTION
S ENTENCING is the bottom line of the criminal justice system.
The expression "bringing the offender to justice" is used not
only to mean that we will locate an offender and then try him or
her for a particular crime, but also that we will actually punish the
offender for the crime. In addition, the nature of the punishment
determines the degree ofjustice. Thus, the aphorism, "let the pun-
ishment fit the crime," intuitively describes justice.
This aphorism is also the seed of the sentencing controversy
over punishment and policy in the war on drugs.' The phrase "let
the punishment fit the crime" has become the slogan of Families
Against Mandatory Minimums (FAMM).2 FAMM was created in
* President, Criminal Justice Policy Foundation. B.A. 1973, Haverford Col-
lege;J.D. 1976, Villanova University School of Law. Former assistant counsel to the
United States House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary, 1979-1989.
The author would like to extend his thanks to April M. Byrd, Lisa S. Paye and
David A. Straite of Villanova Law Review for their assistance in preparing this
article.
1. See, e.g., Stephen Chapman, Does the Punishment Fit the Crime? ORLANDO SEN-
TINEL TRIB., Mar. 23, 1993, at All [hereinafter Chapman, Does the Punishment Fit the
Crime?]. According to Mr. Chapman, federal judges handing down sentences
under the federal drug laws are questioning whether they are giving out suitable
punishments. Id. For example, he quotes one federal judge as saying, "I resent
the fact that Congress has forced me... to sentence a young man ... to jail for 10
years for a crime that doesn't deserve more than three or four." Id. In another
article, he quotes a different judge as saying, "I've always been considered a fairly
harsh sentencer, but it's killing me that I'm sending so many low-level offenders
away for all this time." Stephen Chapman, An Insult to Justice: Large Sentences for
Small Crimes, Cm. TRiB., Mar. 21, 1993, at C3; see also Mark A. Cohen, Explaining
Judicial Behavior or What's "Unconstitutional" About the Sentencing Commission ?, 7 J. L.
ECON. & ORGANIZATIONS 183, 186-87 (1991) (observing that for many judges "the
ability to exercise discretion is ... one of the most rewarding aspects of [their
job]"); News National Report: Supreme Court Justice Faults Sentencing Laws, S.F.
CHRON., Mar. 10, 1994, at A6 (quoting Supreme Court Justice Kennedy as stating,
"I think I am in agreement with most judges in the federal system that mandatory
minimums are imprudent, unwise and often unjust mechanism for sentencing").
But see Fred A. Bernstein, Discretion Redux - Mandatory Minimums, Federal Judges,
and the "Safety Valve" Provisions of the 1994 Crime Act, 20 U. DAYrON L. REv. 765
(1995) (explaining "safety valve" provision enacted by Congress allowing judges to
avoid applying mandatory minimum sentences for many first time drug offenses).
2. Bernstein, supra note 1, at 765 (stating that, according to FAMM, drug
crimes are favorite target of "mandatory minimum" sentences and that FAMM in-
(383)
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1991 to urge Congress to repeal the mandatory minimum sentences
created by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.3 The members of
FAMM assert that mandatory minimum sentences do not fit their
crimes.4
On the other hand, those opposed to the system of drug prohi-
bition altogether are making a broader assertion. They argue that
the conduct that constitutes an act of drug use, or even the many
acts of drug use that are the pattern of addiction, should not be
punished at all.5 Thus, no punishment could properly fit the
crime.
The policies of public office holders provide another way of
looking at the aphorism "let the punishment fit the crime." To the
public, an office holder who argues for and achieves greater pun-
ishments appears more "serious" about the problem of crime, or
perhaps more precisely, more sensitive to public fear of and anger
about crime.6 Consequently, public office holders have a great in-
tends to continue to fight guidelines by reporting effects of sentences on minor
drug offenders serving lengthy sentences).
3. Id.; see alsoJoseph F. Weis, Jr., The Federal Sentencing Guidelines-It's Time for
a Reappraisal 29 AM. CRM. L. REV. 823 (1992) (discussing how Federal Courts
Study Committee has also urged Congress to repeal mandatory minimum
sentences and expressing concern that they "create penalties so distorted as to
hamper federal criminal adjudication").
4. Chapman, Does the Punishment Fit the Crime , supra note 1, at All (recogniz-
ing that federal law allows no parole and requires at least five years in prison for
small scale crimes such as possession of five grams of crack, which weighs less than
a quarter). FAMM considers the federal laws unfair for minor offenders. Id.
5. See Michele H. Kalstein et al., Comment, Calculating Injustice: The Fixation
on Punishment as Crime Control, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 575, 612-13 (1992) (dis-
cussing how Congress has essentially ignored possibility of rehabilitating drug of-
fenders by imposing mandatory minimum sentences). See generally JAMES B.
BAKALAR & LESTER GRINSPOON, DRUG CONTROL IN A FREE SOCIETY (1984); GEOR-
GETTE BENNETT, CRIMEwARPs: THE FUTURE OF CRIME IN AMERICA (1987); STEVEN B.
DUKE & ALBERT C. GROSS, AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR: RETHINKING OUR TRAGIC CRU-
SADE AGAINST DRUGS (1993); ROD L. EVANS & IRWIN M. BERENT, DRUG LEGALIZA-
TION: FOR AND AGAINST (1992);JAMES A. INCIARDI, THE DRUG LEGALIZATION DEBATE
(1991); RUFUS KING, THE DRUG HANG-UP: AMERICA'S FIv-YEAR FOLLY (1972);
MELVYN B. KRAUSS & EDWARD P. LAZEAR, SEARCHING FOR ALTERNATIVES: DRUG CON-
TROL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES (1991); ALFRED R. LINDESMITH, THE ADDICT AND
THE LAW (1965); STANTON PEELE, DISEASING OF AMERICA: ADDICTION TREATMENT
OUT OF CONTROL (1989); THOMAS SZASZ, CEREMONIAL CHEMISTRY: THE RITUAL PER-
SECUTION OF DRUGS, ADDICTS AND PUSHERS (1974); THOMAS SZASZ, OUR RIGHT TO
DRUGS: THE CASE FOR A FREE MARKET (1992) [hereinafter SZASz, OUR RIGHT TO
DRUGS]; MARK THORNTON, THE ECONOMICS OF PROHIBITION (1991); ARNOLD
TREBACH, THE GREAT DRUG WAR: RADICAL PROPOSALS THAT COULD MAKE AMERICA
SAFE AGAIN (1987) [hereinafter TREBACH, THE GREAT DRUG WAR]; ARNOLD
TREBACH, THE HEROIN SOLUTION (1982) [hereinafter TREBACH, THE HEROIN SOLU-
TION]; STEVEN WISOTIW, BREAKING THE IMPASSE IN THE WAR ON DRUGS (1986); Sym-
posium, A Symposium on Drug Decriminalization, 18 HOFSTRA L. REV. 831 (1990).
6. SeeJeffrey Hoff, Prison Overcrowding Poses Tough Issues; Mandatory Sentencing
2
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centive to push for harsher sentences.
In the past decade, the general prison population has in-
creased and, in particular, the prison population of drug offenders
has increased dramatically. 7 From 1980 to 1989, federal drug of-
fenders sentenced to incarceration shot up 262%, from 3,675 to
13,306.8 For 1993, the total number of drug offenders sentenced to
incarceration was 18,698, almost 50% higher.9
These longer sentences arise from the adoption of "tougher"
criminal justice policies, authorization of extensively lengthened
sentences and creation of mandatory minimum sentences.1 0 Ulti-
mately, these increases reflect the value politicians reap from both
dramatizing the drug problem and demonstrating their steadfast-
ness against drug use and drug trafficking.1
for Drugs Questioned, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1991, at 12NJ1 (quoting New York State
Senator Gabriel M. Ambrosio as stating that, "[a]s soon as you raise questions
[about sentencing reform], you run the risk of being called soft on crime"); Kate
Maletz, About Brooklyn/The City; Alternatives to Prison, NEWSDAY, June 4, 1995, at N57
(acknowledging that "[i] n New York State, politicians often decline to back alter-
native sentencing programs for fear of appearing soft on crime."); see also Susan
Yoachum, Drug War Tax Backed by Feinstein; Candidates Are Beginning to Define Their
Differences, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 11, 1990, at Al (detailing candidates' efforts to ap-
pear "tough on crime" in their campaign advertisements).
7. See Packed Prisons: Nations's Inmate Population Climbed to 703,687 Last Year,
ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, May 21, 1990, at 8A [hereinafter Packed Prisons] (stating
that "[t]he number of federal and state prison inmates zoomed to a record
703,687 last year, a 12.1[%] increase over 1988." (quoting BUREAU OF JUSTICE STA-
TISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DRUGS, CRIME AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 190 (Dec.
1992)). According to the Department ofJustice, sentences given for drug offenses
"account for a large number [of the new prison inmates], including 49 [%] of the
inmates committed to federal prisons in the last 10 years." Id. For example, while
the number of defendants disposed of for violations of the Drug Abuse Prevention
and Control Act related to marijuana increased by about 500 from 1990 to 1993,
the number of those defendants imprisoned increased by about 900. See U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. 212 (114th ed. 1994).
8. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DRUGS, CRIME AND
THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 190 (Dec. 1992).
9. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. 212 (114th ed.
1994).
10. See Does the Punishment Fit the Crime?, supra note 1, at Al1 (stating that even
possession of very small amounts of drugs may require at least five years
"mandatory minimum" sentence); Hoff, supra note 6, at 12NJ (recognizing that
many hold mandatory drug sentences responsible for "skyrocketing" prison popu-
lation); Maletz, supra note 6, at N57 (quoting representative of nonprofit organiza-
tion which seeks alternatives to prison for women, saying that since mandatory
sentences for drug offenses have become rule "population in women's prisons has
exploded"); Packed Prisons, supra note 7, at 8A (reporting agency attributing cause
of increase in prison population to adoption of tougher criminal justice policies).
11. See Hoff, supra note 6, at 12NJ1 (declaring that there is political reluctance
to rescind mandatory drug sentences because lawmakers desire to appear tough
on crime); Maletz, supra note 6, at N57 (describing politicians in New York State as
having fear of appearing soft on crime); see also Yoachum, supra note 6, at Al
1995]
3
Sterling: The Sentencing Boomerang: Drug Prohibition Politics and Reform
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1995
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
This article will look squarely at current U.S. drug prohibition
policy and politics. 12 In Part II, this article will furnish an abbrevi-
ated overview of historical theories on crime and punishment.'
3
Part III will raise some questions relating to the proper role of the
courts in U.S. drug policy.' 4 Next, Part IV of this article will give a
brief history of U.S. drug prohibition policy and discuss the lan-
guage of the drug policy debate in the context of the "war on
drugs."' 5 Part IV will also provide a glossary of current drug policy
reform terms and a paradigm of current drug enforcement.16 In
Part V, the article will discuss the history of mandatory minimum
sentences, in the context of the sentencing debates surrounding
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 and the 1994 Crime Bill.' 7 Lastly,
in Part VI, this article will conclude by making a series of recom-
mendations for reform of U.S. drug policies.18
II. CRIME AND PUNISHMENT: AN ABBREVIATED OVERVIEW OF
THEORY
Historically, the concepts of crime and punishment have been
tied together. Cesare Beccaria (1738-1794), in his treatise ON
CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS, concluded that, in order to prevent the
commission of crimes, there must be proper punishments for
crimes.' 9 There is an initial harm to society - the individual's
crime. 20 There is a second harm: to the individual - punish-
ment.2 ' But, when punishment is inflicted to a degree proportional
(pointing out candidates' desire to appear tough on crime because not to could
harm their public perception).
12. For a discussion of current U.S. drug prohibition policy and politics, see
infra notes 119-63 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of historical theories on crime and punishment, see infra
notes 19-46 and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the proper role of the courts in U.S. drug policy, see
infra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of U.S. drug prohibition policy and the language of U.S.
drug policy in the context of the "war on drugs," see infra notes 49-66 and accom-
panying text.
16. For a discussion of current drug policy reform terms and a paradigm of
current drug enforcement, see infra notes 67-118 and accompanying text.
17. For a discussion of case histories, policy, politics and the sentencing de-
bate, see infra notes 119-63 and accompanying text.
18. For further discussion of recommendations for new drug enforcement
policies, see infra notes 164-208 and accompanying text.
19. CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 62-64 (Henry Paolucci
trans., 1963) (1764); see also STEPHEN BROWN ET AL., CRIMINOLOGY: EXPLAINING
CRIME AND ITS CONTEXT 216-21 (1991) (discussing Beccaria's theories on crime
and punishment).
20. BROWN ET AL., supra note 19, at 219.
21. Id. at 221.
[Vol. 40: p. 383
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to the crime, it deters people from undertaking crime in the first
place.2 2 Thus, the government justifies punishing the individual by
balancing the two harms. 28
Beccaria was an advocate of crime prevention.2 4 His theory was
deterrence through the threat of punishment.2 5 He acknowledged
that the potential infliction of pain or harm for making the crimi-
nal choice deters only the rational actor.26 Therefore, for effective
deterrence, Beccaria identified three necessary principles of pun-
ishment: certainty,2 7 celerity (speed)28 and severity.29 Certainty
meant that the laws needed to be clear, broadcast to prevent igno-
rance of the law, and enforced in a consistent manner.30 Speed was
based on the presumed importance of quickly associating the crime
with the punishment in the mind of the offender and with the pub-
lic.3 1 Severity was based on a principle of proportionality; the pun-
ishment should exceed the profit from the crime, but just barely.3 2
Accordingly, excessive punishment is a waste.33
PhilosopherJeremy Bentham (1748-1832), the father of "utili-
tarian" philosophy, wrote at the time of the founding of the Ameri-
can Republic.3 4 He adopted Beccaria's punishment principles and
added two others: sensibility and exemplarity.3 5 Sensibility de-
scribed the specific characteristics of the offender - such as age,
gender, strength, health and wealth - which, Bentham argued,
should be weighed when choosing punishment.3 6 Exemplarity was
the appearance of the punishment to potential offenders.3 7 Ben-
22. Id. at 219-21.
23. Id. at 221.
24. Id. at 219 ("It is better to prevent crimes than to punish them." (quoting
Beccaria, supra note 19, at 93)).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 219-21.
27. BECCARIA, supra note 19, at 58-59, 93-99; BROWN ET AL., supra note 19, at
220-21.
28. BECCARIA, supra note 19, at 55-57; BRoWN ET AL., supra note 19, at 220-21.
29. BECCARIA, supra note 19, at 58-59, 93-99; BROWN ET AL., supra note 19, at
220-21.
30. BROWN, supra note 19, at 221.
31. See id. (stating that procrastinations in regard to punishment lead to in-
creased probability of future violations).
32. Id.
33. Id. Beccaria felt severity of punishment was justifiable, but only to accom-
plish desired effect, because "[a]ll beyond this is superfluous and for that reason
tyrannical." Id. (quoting BECCARIA, supra note 19, at 43).
34. Id. at 223-24.
35. Id. at 224.
36. Id.
37. Id.
19951 387
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tham argued that, from a crime prevention perspective, actual pun-
ishment was less important than the appearance that severe
punishment would be likely.3 8
The principle of exemplarity might support the opposite of
what is today being touted in Congress as "truth in sentencing."3 9
Following Bentham's theory, it might be more desirable for the gov-
ernment to sentence an offender for many years but not make the
offender actually serve his or her full sentence. The government
would merely make the general public and potential offenders be-
lieve that the full sentence would actually be served.
The advocates of "truth in sentencing" are adamant that the
long sentences that are often imposed in systems of indeterminate
sentencing actually be served.40 This position relies on two arbi-
trary absolutes. First, advocates of "truth in sentencing" argue that
a defendant must serve at least 85% of the imposed sentence in
prison. 41 This threshold percentage was arrived at arbitrarily: no
research suggests that the public thinks 85% would be more "true"
than 100% or 50%.42
38. Id. ("Perceptions of punishment by those contemplating crimes is more
important than the actual punishment imposed.").
39. See Truth in Sentencing Incentive Grants, Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 20102 (1994) (establishing re-
quirements for sentencing which states must meet in order to receive federal grant
money for prisons); see also Leslie Phillips, Winners, Losers in Legislation, USA TODAY,
Apr. 22, 1994, at 4A (discussing progress of House of Representatives anti-crime
bill and stating that proponents of "truth in sentencing" lost effort to require states
to imprison inmates for 85% of their sentences in order to receive federal fund-
ing); Mary Jo Pitzl, Lawmakers Vow 100-Day Session; Leaders to Focus on Major Issues,
ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Jan. 10, 1993, at BI (discussing progress of "Truth in Sentencing"
legislation in Arizona state legislature).
40. See 140 CONG. REc. H2240 (daily ed. Apr. 13, 1994) (statement of Rep. Bill
McCollum). Representative Bill McCollum, a leading Republican of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, stated:
If we are going to provide money and, yes, we should provide money for
prisons, for States to build more prisons to house these violent criminals,
then we should provide some eligibility requirements to ensure that the
States are going to change their laws to guarantee that those who commit
violent crimes and are repeat violent offenders serve at least 85[% of
their sentences instead of getting out after serving only a fraction.
Id.
41. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, VIOLENT OFFENDER
INCARCERATION AND TRUTH IN SENTENCING INCENTIVE GRANT PROGRAM: INTERIM Fi-
NAL RuLE 5 (1994) (explaining that to be eligible for funding under Truth in Sen-
tencing Grant Program, states must meet certain sentencing requirements). To be
eligible to receive funding under the Federal Truth in Sentencing Program, a state
must either (1) ensure that violent offenders "serve not less than 85% of their
sentences, or (2) meet other requirements that ensure that violent offenders, and
especially repeat violent offenders, remain incarcerated for substantially greater
percentages of their imposed sentences." Id.
42. See Weis, supra note 3, at 823 (stating that imprisonment terms are arbi-
[Vol. 40: p. 383
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Second, advocates of "truth in sentencing" maintain that "truth
in sentencing" should apply only to violent crimes (defined or rede-
fined for political purposes to include various drug offenses), and
that the only means for expanding the punishment capacity for vio-
lent offenders is to build new high security prisons.43 Conse-
quently, the advocates of "truth in sentencing" reject the approach
of diverting non-violent offenders to facilities or programs that
would have the effect of freeing up prison space.44
On the other hand, perhaps "truth in sentencing" itself could
be used as a sentencing gimmick, to serve Bentham's principle of
exemplarity.45 Assume that the United States adopts "truth in sen-
tencing" and spends tens of billions of dollars on new prison con-
struction, but then quietly plans to cease operating those new
prisons - which are enormously expensive to operate - after five
or ten years.
If, for the next five or ten years, the government successfully
makes potential criminals aware of the new prisons and longer im-
prisonments of the "truth in sentencing" approach, the exemplarity
principle (the modern deterrence theory) would predict that these
measures would reduce the overall crime rate. According to Ben-
tham's theories, individuals would choose not to commit crimes out
trarily set by Congress, often as response to perceived public call to be "tough on
crime").
43. See 140 CONG. REc. H2442-50 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1994) (debating, in
House of Representatives, amendment to H.R. 4092 offered by Rep. Bill McCollum
of Florida). This proposed amendment provided billions of dollars to the states to
construct or operate prison space for violent offenders if these states changed their
laws to require violent offenders to serve at least 85% of their sentences and passed
"three strikes and your're out" laws. Id. at H2444; see also Nkechi Taifa, "Three
Strikes and You're Out "-Mandatory Life Imprisonment for Third-time Felons, 20 U. DAY-
TON L. Rv. 717 (1995) (explaining that such provisions impose mandatory life
sentence without parole on offenders convicted of third violent offense).
44. Representative WilliamJ. Hughes proposed a substitute for the McCollum
amendment in § 601(b) of H.R. 4092, by providing in section 601(b) (4) for:
assurances that the State or States have a comprehensive correctional
plan which represents an integrated approach to the management and
operation of correctional facilities and programs and which includes
diversional programs, particularly drug diversion programs, community
corrections programs, a prisoner screening and security classification sys-
tem, prisoners rehabilitation and treatment programs, prisoner work ac-
tivities (including, to the extent practicable, activities relating to the
development, expansion, modification, or improvement of correctional
facilities), and job skills programs, a pre-release prisoner assessment to
provide risk reduction management, post-release assistance, and an as-
sessment of recidivism rates ....
140 CONG. REc. H2443-44 (daily ed. April 19, 1994) (statement of Rep. Hughes).
45. For a further discussion of Bentham's exemplarity principle, see supra
notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
1995]
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of fear of serving really hard time in the new prisons. Then, in
order to avoid bankruptcy, in five or ten years the U.S. could quietly
restore parole in varying degrees of control, including release with
home confinement.
At that time, the United States might need to adopt another
sentencing gimmick in order to carry forward the illusion of serious
punishment. Excellent candidates for such gimmick punishments
include caning, whipping, stocks and pillories, mutilation and so
forth. Essentially, the United States could use the threat of a series
of severe punishments to maintain public fear of punishment.
In this sense, "truth in sentencing" can be analogized to the
Reagan-era build-up of U.S. weaponry. The United States
threatened to use a punishment - its well-funded and newly en-
larged military - against the Soviet Union. This threat in turn may
have helped the United States win the "cold war" with the Soviet
Union. With the crumbling of the Soviet Union, the United States
no longer needed this threat and, therefore, adopted a new pro-
gram with the Soviet Union - one of mutually destroying national
weaponries. In the same fashion, the United States could loudly
adopt one punishment gimmick to instill fear of severe punishment
in potential criminals, such as the construction of many new prisons
or some form of corporal punishment, and then quietly wait for the
need to actually inflict the punishment to pass. However, crime is
likely to increase steadily for the next fifteen years as the population
of teenagers and young adults increases. 46 The prospect that pris-
ons and punishments will not be used is absurd.
III. ROLE OF THE COURTS
What role the courts should play in the U.S. drug policy raises
some preliminary questions:
1. Can we distinguish justice from law enforcement? Is it
the role of the courts to be part of the crime fighting es-
tablishment, or merely to assure procedural fairness and
justice are maintained in that fight? Should ajudge be an
ally of the police and the prosecution, or an independent
actor from those establishments?
2. Further, does the concept of "the criminal justice sys-
tem" erroneously blur important distinctions between the
46. Malcolm Gladwell, Baby Boom's Urban Cradle Braces for Future Rocked by
Crime, WASH. POST, May 26, 1994, at A25 (stating that criminologists predict an-
other crime wave in early part of next century when crest of current baby boom
reaches late adolescence).
[Vol. 40: p. 383
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roles of judges, police agencies, prosecutors and correc-
tional personnel? Or, does the concept appropriately
help to unify them with a common mission? In other
words, should the courts be independent agents ofjustice,
or just another component of the entire investigation,
prosecution and punishment system?
3. What should we do if there is a difference between
what may be an "appropriate punishment" today and a
sentence that may have the very hard-to-measure potential
of preventing future crime?47
These questions help to point out that in thinking about the
controversy over sentencing, where one stands depends upon
where one sits. A judge that imposes a sentence is almost always
also imposing a punishment.48 For this reason, a judge's belief re-
lating to the proper role of the courts in the U.S. drug enforcement
program can be important.
IV. DRUG POLICY
A. A Brief History of American Prohibition Policy
Prior to 1914, the sale, manufacture, possession and use of
47. Congress has statutorily delineated the factors for federal judges to con-
sider when imposing a sentence:
(a) FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN IMPOSING A SENTENCE. - The court
shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to
comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsec-
tion. The court, in determining the particular sentence to be im-
posed, shall consider -
(2) the need for the sentence imposed -
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect
for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant;
and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or voca-
tional training, medical care, or other correctional treat-
ment in the most effective manner ....
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (1985 & Supp. 1995).
48. There are, of course, exceptions. One example is the Florida case of
Kenny and Barbra Jenks, a couple convicted of growing marijuana to relieve the
wasting syndrome of AIDS, from which they both were suffering. Jenks v. Florida,
582 So. 2d 676, 677 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). The First District Court of Appeals
of Florida held that the defendants satisfied the common law requirements of a
medical necessity defense, thereby reversing the lower court's sentence of proba-
tion. Id. at 680. The Florida Circuit Court had rejected the defendant's common-
law medical necessity argument and sentenced the defendants to unsupervised
probation with the condition that they care for each other. Id. at 678.
19951
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drugs were legal under federal law. For example, throughout the
nineteenth century, opium was available as a drug in patent
medicines. The drug's use became fairly widespread during the
Civil War and grew in the latter half of the nineteenth century. A
tariff was even imposed on its importation.
Further, prior to 1914, the use and manufacture of morphine
and cocaine was also permitted under federal Law. Scientists iso-
lated morphine, the most powerful alkaloid in opium and, with the
development of the hypodermic syringe, doctors began to use the
drug in medicine to relieve pain.49 After it was isolated from the
coca plant in the mid-nineteenth century, cocaine was also widely
used. Physicians and drug companies, who had compounded it
into many forms, prescribed the drug.
By 1900, there were an estimated 250,000 narcotics addicts in
the United States.50 The addict population included persons of all
races and classes. At the same time, however, the public generally
identified addicts as either foreign or domestic minorities.
Chinese immigrants were identified with opium smoking, as
part of an alleged Chinese effort to undermine American society.51
Southern African-Americans were identified by whites with cocaine
addiction. One historian writes that "[t]he South feared that [Afri-
can-American] cocaine users might become oblivious of their pre-
scribed bounds and attack white society."5 2 The historian further
states, "[o] ne of the most terrifying beliefs about cocaine was that it
actually improved pistol marksmanship. Another myth, that co-
caine made blacks almost unaffected by mere .32 caliber bullets, is
said to have caused Southern police departments to switch to .38
caliber revolvers."5 3
Simultaneous to the rise in concern over narcotics use was a
rise in persecution of these groups associated with narcotics use.
The United States Congress began acting to exclude Chinese labor-
49. See DAVID F. MusTo, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC CON-
TROL 2 (1973). Musto relates that morphine manufacture from crude opium was
undertaken in Philadelphia beginning in 1832. Id.
50. Id. at 5, 253 n.13; see also DAVID T. COURTWRIGHT, DARK PARADISE: OPIATE
ADDIcriON IN AMERICA BEFORE 1940 9 (1982) (estimating that opiate addiction
reached peak in 1914 - with 313,000 addicts - and then began steady decline).
51. MusTo, supra note 49, at 6, 254 n.14 (citing E.C. SANDMEYER, THE ANTI-
CHINESE MOVEMENT IN CALIFORNIA (1939)).
52. Id. at 6. "Examination of the Atlanta Constitution (27 Dec. 1914) also
reveals a frequently claimed association between cocaine use and the Negro; by
1914 the Atlanta police chief was blaming '70% of the crimes on drug use.' " Id. at
254 n.15.
53. Id. at 7.
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ers, and attacks on Chinese immigrants and Chinese travelers oc-
curred in the United States. In response to this persecution,
Chinese merchants in China began an embargo against American
goods in 1905. Similarly, Southern white fear of cocaine use by Af-
rican-Americans led to "lynchings, legal segregation, and voting
laws all designed to remove [their] political and social power
"54
At the same time, the United States also became concerned
about Filipino opium use. The United States acquired the Philip-
pine Islands from Spain after the war in 1898. Prior to this time,
Spain had operated an opium monopoly. After the Filipino inde-
pendence movement was crushed, an effort to re-establish this mo-
nopoly was stymied by political opposition in the United States,
culminating in 1905, when Congress prohibited opium use by na-
tive Filipinos. Congress did not apply this ban to non-native Filipi-
nos (largely ethnic Chinese) for another three years.55
Outside of the United States, concern about opium use was
also rising. Opium had been shipped to China by the British since
before the Opium Wars of the mid-nineteenth century. As a result,
opium had been a major source of revenue to the government of
India, and thus the United Kingdom. In January of 1906, however,
the Liberal Party took control of the British government and
pledged to eliminate the opium trade to China. In the same year,
the Dowager Empress of China issued regulations to curb the use of
opium. 56 In the minds of the Chinese, opium trade and addiction
were increasingly associated with the evil of foreign domination.
Not surprisingly, President Theodore Roosevelt quickly sup-
ported a proposal from an anti-narcotics crusader for an interna-
tional conference to assist China in resisting opium. President
Roosevelt named Dr. Hamilton Wright to organize this effort for
the United States. Dr. Wright sought to strengthen his hand at the
international conference by getting federal anti-narcotics legisla-
tion enacted. Because a comprehensive law would have offended
pharmacists, pharmaceutical companies and physicians, he was only
partially successful. On February 9, 1909, Congress enacted a ban
on the importation and possession of smoking opium. 57
54. Id.
55. Id. at 25-27.
56. Id. at 29.
57. Smoking Opium Exclusion Act, 21 U.S.CA. §§ 176-185 (1909) (repealed
1970); see also COURTWRIGHT, supra note 50, at 81-83 (explaining significance of
Smoking Opium Exclusion Act); MUSTO, supra note 49, at 30-35 (describing events
leading up to adoption of Act).
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Following the Shanghai Opium Commission, Dr. Wright en-
couraged the passage of much broader federal anti-drug legislation.
He began promoting the danger of cocaine, especially as it was be-
ing used by African-Americans in the South.58 In his official report
to Congress, Dr. Wright concluded, "it has been authoritatively
stated that cocaine is often the direct incentive to the crime of rape
by the [African-Americans] of the South and other sections of the
country."
59
Eventually, Wright was successful in persuading Congressman
David Foster, a Republican from Vermont and Chairman of the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, to introduce a complex drug
prohibition law, in the guise of a revenue measure, on April 30,
1910. Wright's plan began to unravel when, after eighteen years of
Republican control, the Democrats took control of the House of
Representatives in the 1910 election. After a day of hearings in
which many industries that would be affected testified, opposition
grew, and the Foster bill ultimately died in February of 1911.60
In December of 1911, the International Conference on Opium
convened in the Hague. Bishop Charles Henry Brent, an Ameri-
can, chaired the conference of twelve nations. Germany attacked
the U.S. delegation, asking what assurances existed that Congress
would enact legislation to implement the international controls. In
response, Wright gave his assurance. 61
Back in the United States, the Democrats took over both the
White House and the Senate in the 1912 elections. The newly uni-
fied Congress convened in March of 1913, and on June 10, 1913,
the Harrison Narcotics Act (Harrison Act) was introduced, incorpo-
rating many compromises from the failed Foster bill. 62 Unlike the
Foster bill, this legislation passed both houses of Congress. On De-
cember 17, 1914, President Wilson signed the Harrison Act into
law.63
58. MuSTO, supra note 49, at 43-44. Dr. Wright emphasized the importance of
legislation to curtail the spread of cocaine among African-Americans, relying on
public perceptions that African Americans were most likely to commit crime due
to their use of cocaine. Id.
59. MUSTO, supra note 49, at 43-44, 264 & n.40 (citing HAMILTON WRIGHT,
REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL OPIUM COMMISSION AND ON THE OPIUM PROBLEM AS
SEEN WITHIN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS POSSESSIONS, in Opium Problem: Message
from the President of the Unites States, S. Doc. No. 377, 61st Cong., 2nd Sess. 47
(1910).
60. MUSTO, supra note 49, at 44-48.
61. Id. at 49-51.
62. Id. at 270 & n.1.
63. Id. at 59-61.
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Unfortunately, cynical exploitation of racial fear and hatred
became a central legislative strategy in the enactment of narcotics
prohibition. The legislative treatment of cannabis serves as a fur-
ther example. Cannabis had been included in the early drafts of
the narcotics legislation, although its inclusion was opposed by the
pharmaceutical industry and it was eventually dropped from the en-
acted version of the Harrison Act. An historian writes that "[n]ot
even the [prohibitionists] claimed, in the pre-World War I hearings
and debates over a federal antinarcotic act, that cannabis was a
problem of any major significance in the United States"; in fact,
"If] ear of cannabis, or marihuana, as it was beginning to be known,
was minimal throughout most of the nation in the 1920s."64 At the
same time, however, " [i] n areas with concentrations of Mexican im-
migrants, who tended to use marihuana as a drug of entertainment
or relaxation, the fear of marihuana was intense .... Although
employers welcomed [Mexicans] in the twenties, Mexicans were
also feared as a source of crime and deviant social behavior."65
With the beginning of the Great Depression, Mexicans, "who had
been welcomed by at least a fraction of the communities in which
they lived, became an unwelcome surplus in regions devastated by
unemployment . -66 To a great extent, attitudes in the United
States toward Mexican-Americans led to prohibiting cannabis use.
B. The Language of Drug Policy from the Perspective of the War on
Drugs
For some time, people have used the phrase "the war on drugs"
or "the drug war" to describe the status quo in the United States. 67
As of 1988, Representative Charles Rangel, a Democrat from New
York and former chairman of the House Select Committee on Nar-
cotics Abuse and Control from 1981 to 1993, has said that the
United States had hardly declared a war on drugs.68 Further,
64. Id. at 216-17.
65. Id. at 219.
66. Id. at 219-20.
67. See DuKE & GRoss, supra note 5, at 200-31 (detailing different approaches
by United States to stop drug use and concluding that, if anything, drug war has
made things worse in United States); TREBACH, THE GREAT DRUG WAR, supra note
5, at 1-5 (describing war on drugs waged by Reagan administration and recogniz-
ing that it has done nothing to make America better place); WISOTSKY, supra note
5, at 3 (stating that at least two administrations have declared a "war on drugs" in
attempt to stop spread of drug use with no positive results).
68. Legalization of Illicit Drugs: Impact and Feasibility, Hearings Before House Select
Comm. on Narcotics Abuse and Control 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-3 (1988) [hereinafter
Legalization Hearings] (stating that there has hardly been war on drugs because "it
has not been the policy of [the Reagan] administration to fund local state law
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although the Clinton administration declined to label the current
effort a "war," it is still a fairly massive one, involving the arrest of
more than one million persons in 1993 for drug abuse violations by
state and local police. 69 In comparison, only about 750,000 persons
were arrested for all violent offenses in 1993.70
Since the first term of the Reagan presidency, the phrase "the
war on drugs" has been used as a metaphor for an intense govern-
mental effort to "combat" drug abuse and drug trafficking, much
like the effort intended by President Johnson when he declared a
"war on poverty. '71 In October of 1982, President Reagan ran up
the United States "battle flag" against the drug problem. He an-
nounced an eight-point anti-drug program, including a major in-
crease in funding to fight "organized crime drug trafficking." 72
In the early 1980s, efforts in the United States to combat drug
use began to reflect the military flavor of anti-drug use rhetoric. In
the early 1980s, the conflict between Colombian and Cuban drug
traffickers for primacy in the South Florida cocaine wholesale mar-
kets was fought in a number of day-light machine gun battles, and
with assassinations and drive-by shootings. This led to the height-
ened sense that the drug traffickers - alliteratively called the "co-
caine cartel" or the "Colombian cartel" - were an armed, military
threat. In response, in December of 1981, Congress amended the
Department of Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1982 to
permit U.S. military forces to provide assistance to law enforcement
agencies for drug enforcement purposes. 73 Vice President Bush
was then chosen to head the task force to combat illicit drug traffic
[drug] enforcement" (opening statement of Rep. Charles B Rangel, Chairman,
Presiding)).
69. The actual number was 1,126,300 in 1993. U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, CRIME
IN THE UNITED STATES, 1993, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 217 (1994).
70. Id. Violent offenses include murder, non-negligent manslaughter, forci-
ble rape, robbery and aggravated assault. Id.
71. See Bill Farr & Carol McGraw, Drug Enforcers Losing Nation's Cocaine War,
LA. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1986, at 1-1 (outlining nation's ever-increasing effort to win
war on drugs even though it has been thoroughly beaten by shear numbers). It is
interesting to note the contrast between the martial language used to describe U.S.
efforts to control drug use and the kinds of language routinely used to describe
other aspects of the drug problem. Words used in the latter context often have
medical or religious implications. For example, medical terms such as "epidemic,"
"pandemic," and "plague," or religious terms such as "scourge" are routinely used
to describe the severity of the drug abuse problem.
72. President's Message Announcing the Federal Initiatives Against Drug
Trafficking and Organized Crime Program, 18 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1311
(Oct. 14, 1982).
73. 10 U.S.C. § 374 (1994); see also Military Cooperation with Civilian Law En-
forcement: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Crime of House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1985) (outlining feasibility and appropriateness of further
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in South Florida.74
In April of 1986, President Reagan, in another escalation of
rhetoric into action, signed a National Security Decision Directive
identifying drug traffickers as a national security threat.75 With this
directive, the administration sought to bring military, intelligence
and other national security assets more fully into the anti-narcotics
effort.
76
During the 1980s, public officials frequently compared U.S.
anti-drug use efforts to a military campaign. On various occasions,
public officials declared that although they had not lost any constit-
uents to the Soviets, they were losing hundreds of constituents to
cocaine and crack.77 They often noted that, if the single engine
airplanes routinely flying into and violating the U.S. airspace with
loads of cocaine had been carrying bombs instead of drugs, a military
response would be required. 78
This rhetoric, too, escalated into action. In 1986, Representa-
tive Duncan Hunter, a Republican from California and a member
of the Armed Services Committee, successfully offered an amend-
ment calling upon the President and the military forces to stop
substantial military assistance for drug law enforcement (statement of Rep. William
J. Hughes, Chairman, Presiding)).
74. STAFF CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE OF SENATE COMM. ON GOVERN-
MENTAL AFFAIRS (HARRY HOGAN), 100lH CONG., 2D SESS., REPORT ON DRUG CON-
TROL AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL: COORDINATION AND DIRECTION 965 (Comm. Print
1988).
75. PETER D. SCOTT & JONATHAN MARSHALL, COCAINE POLITICS: DRUGS, AR-
MIES AND THE CIA IN CENTRAL AMERICA 102 (1991).
76. Id.
77. New York City Mayor Edward I. Koch stated:
Isn't that drug pusher, drug smuggler, doing more to injure this country
than the Soviet Union? . . . But I am telling you at this particular mo-
ment, there's probably little danger that [the Soviet Union is] going to
send terrorists over with bombs or weapons, little danger .... But the
drug pusher is coming in every day, and the drug smuggler, every day.
Eighteen thousand plane loads. Thousands of boats.
Military Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 109 (1985) (statement
of Edward I. Koch, Mayor of New York City). The mayor further stated, "[d] rug
pushers are terrorists as much so as people who come in. We are being bombed by
the drug pushers. Should we not repel drug invaders with the same vigor that we
repel military invaders? They are killing the country, they are the scourge of
America." Id. at 110.
78. Florida Governor Bob Graham stated that "[a]s a nation, we cannot toler-
ate low-flying aircraft penetrating our borders from foreign countries. Incidents of
this nature are serious, because just as these aircrafts [sic] are landing with drugs
today, they could land with enemy troops tomorrow." Id. at 231 (statement for the
record of Bob Graham, Governor of Florida, on behalf of National Governor's
Assoc.).
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drug smuggling in forty-five days.79 In 1989, Congress turned re-
sponsibility for the detection and monitoring of aerial and mari-
time transit of illegal drugs over to the United States Department of
Defense. 80
By the mid-1980s, however, the term "the drug war" was being
used to describe not only the government's response to the drug
problem, but also the problem itself.81 Members of Congress would
talk about what we were doing about the "drug war": they referred
to what was taking place on America's streets, which were riddled by
drug-related violence.82 In open-air drug markets, drug dealers
would use violence - to pay back those who had taken advantage
of them and to deter others from taking advantage of them in the
future - and to resolve conflicts with suppliers or distributors
about payments or quality of goods.83 The increased penalties be-
ing enacted by Congress only raised the stakes for drug dealers.84
The murder rate rose dramatically in Washington, D.C., and the
hyperbole of the "drug war" - really a kind of "drug market civil
war" - was used evermore irresponsibly. 85
At the same time, the "drug war" label transformed those who
used drugs - ostensibly those who were supposed to be helped by
79. SCOTT & MARSHALL, supra note 75, at 102; 132 CONG. REc. H6662-70 (daily
ed. Sept. 11, 1986) (roll call vote no. 367 on Hunter Amendment 237-177, 17 not
voting).
80. 10 U.S.C. § 124 (1994).
81. See Farr & McGraw, supra note 71, at 1-1 (discussing federal effort to deal
not only with importation of illicit drugs but also problem of debilitating effect of
wide-spread use among U.S. citizens).
82. See Sco-rr & MARSHALL, supra note 75, at x.
In some areas of Los Angeles, the scene resembles a public market, with
competing dealers loudly hawking their wares on the sidewalk, telling
passers-by that their cocaine is better than the next dealers. In some ar-
eas, armed dealers make house calls in pickup trucks equipped with tele-
phones to take orders.
Id. at x.
83. Id.
84. See Patrick Cockburn, Semi-Automatic Weapons Fuel D.C. Way of Death, OT-
TAWA CITIZEN, Oct. 24, 1993, at A3. Mr. Cockburn quotes William Chambliss, a
criminologist at George Washington University, as saying that the "mandatory
sentences for drug offenses have driven up the number of murders." Id. Cham-
bliss continues:
The increase in the penalty for drugs means that it always makes sense for
a drug dealer to kill a rival or an informant and the two are often the
same. A life sentence for homicide means that you get an average of 16
to 18 years in prison. A mandatory sentence for selling drugs may put
you inside for 40 years. For a professional criminal, killing makes sense.
Id.
85. See id. ("[T]he record of the U.S. capital as one of the most dangerous
cities in the world looks secure.")
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drug laws - into the enemy and then into a subhuman category of
"the druggies" or "druggers." They ceased to be people with drug
problems, chemical disorders, or brain disease, and became the
"bad guys," as the publics' hatred of drugs grew into a hatred of
druggies. For the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and DEA per-
sonnel who train State and local police, this hatred translated into a
variety of practices: druggies and their families could be rousted,
humiliated, terrorized, jailed, hurt, threatened with being shot, or
even, if necessary, shot.86
C. Glossary of Drug Policy Reform Terms
Understanding the critique of current drug policy requires fa-
miliarity with the meanings of some frequently used terms. For one
thing, terms such as "legalization" are very ambiguous. For an-
other, the terms have different meanings when used or heard by
different people. Definitions of frequently used drug policy terms
follow:
1. Legalization (used by proponents)
Ethan Nadelmann argued in 198887 and in 198988 that this
term means several things. First, and probably most ambiguously,
86. See, e.g., MIKE TIDWELL, IN THE SHADOW OF THE WHITE HOUSE: DRUGS,
DEATH, AND REDEMPTION ON THE STREETS OF THE NATION'S CAPITAL 193-99 (1992)
(detailing Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) raid on citizens of
neighborhood based on "suspected" drug possession and use); TERRY WILLIAMS,
CRACKHOUSE: NOTES FROM THE END OF THE LINE 89 (1992); Tony Mauro, The War
on Drugs; Are Our Rights on the Line?, USA TODAY, Nov. 15, 1989, at Al (reporting
that police shot and killed suspected drug user while executing a search warrant
based on an informant's tip that was 20 months old); Don Terry, Philadelphia
Shaken by Criminal Police Officers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1995, at Al (discussing police
corruption whereby police "pocket[ed] more than $100,000 in cash they robbed
from suspected drug dealers through beatings, intimidations, illegal searches and
denying suspects their constitutional rights").
Citizens, who sought police protection in neighborhoods where drug dealers
operated, "found they had asked to be victimized themselves, as police quickly
showed that a different constitutional standard applies to minority citizens even in
their own neighborhoods. In Harlem and Washington Heights, at one point, peo-
ple were stopped because they 'looked like drug dealers.' For some police officers,
this meant any black or Latino driving a late-model car; others, it was later discov-
ered, thought racially mixed couples looked like drug dealers." WILLIAMS, supra, at
89.
87. Ethan A. Nadelmann, The Case for Legalization, 92 THE PUBLIC INTEREST,
Summer 1988, at 3-31 [hereinafter Nadelman, The Case for Legalization]; see also
Ethan A. Nadelmann, U.S. Drug Policy: A Bad Export, 70 FOREIGN POLICY, Spring
1988, at 83-108 (reprinted in Legalization Hearings, supra note 67, at 457-70) (outlin-
ing prospective drug legalization in America and its possible implications).
88. Ethan A. Nadelmann, Drug Prohibition in the United States: Costs, Conse-
quences, and Alternatives, 245 SCIENCE, Sept. 1, 1989, at 939-47.
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"legalization" means only that the "war on drugs" should be subject
to a cost-benefit analysis.8 9 To advocate "legalization of drugs" is to
say that the war on drugs (or drug prohibition) is ineffective,
counter-productive, or at least very costly, and that "alternatives"
should be studied.90
Second, "legalization" is used to refer to a policy that now ille-
gal drugs should be available legally to users in order to reduce
violence and crime, the abuses of drug enforcement and violation
of civil liberties, as well as the large criminal profits. The terms of
that availability are not specified; it is usually left unsaid. For exam-
ple, what drugs, what dosage forms, what circumstances and which
classes of users, would be subject to "legalization." 91 Other com-
mentators use the term in other ways, usually with different assump-
tions about the legalization scheme.
Third, "legalization," as used by non-specialists, commonly re-
fers to drugs would be or should be legal in the same manner as
alcohol or tobacco. Usually this implicitly includes a prohibition on
sales to minors and, often, a prohibition on advertising. This term
usually refers only to marijuana, even sometimes when the speaker
calls for the "legalization of drugs." The National Task Force on
Cannabis Regulation, chaired by Richard M. Evans, an attorney in
Northampton, Massachusetts, drafted a bill in December of 1982 to
legalize marijuana in the same manner as alcohol, but with a ban
on all advertising. 92
89. For example, a bill was considered in the New Hampshire Assembly Com-
mittee on Health, Human Services and the Elderly on January 10, 1990. It had
been introduced by Representative Michael Weddle, a Democrat from Ports-
mouth, to establish a 17-person committee to study the benefits and consequences
of legalizing all illegal drugs. Christopher Comfort, Bill Would Provide Look at Legal-
izingDrugs, PORTSMOUTH HERALD,Jan. 9, 1990, at Al; Tom Fahey, Study on Legalized
Drugs Sought, UNION-LEADER, Jan. 11, 1990, at 18; Linda Goetz, Legalized Drugs
Sparks Debate, CONCORD MONITOR, Jan. 11, 1990, at BI; Gary Rayno, Weddle Drug Bill
Elicits Impassioned Debate, FOSTER'S DAILY DEMOCRAT, Jan. 12, 1990, at 3.
90. See, e.g., Legalization Hearings, supra note 68, at 180-211 (arguing that cost
of "war on drugs" might far outweigh that of decriminalization of drugs (testimony
of Kurt L. Schmoke, Mayor of Baltimore)).
91. Nadelman, The Casefor Legalization, supra note 87; see also Legalization Hear-
ings, supra note 68, at 303-07 (arguing that, because present U.S. drug policy is
"absolute failure," country should decriminalize and then control use of mari-
huana, cocaine and heroin (testimony of WilliamJ. Chambliss)); id. at 314-65 (stat-
ing that current U.S. drug policy is national tragedy and calling for drastic changes
from current policies (testimony of Arnold S. Trebach)); id. at 409-56 (endorsing
relaxation of drug laws in some areas and intensification in other areas (testimony
of Steven Wisotsky)).
92. THE NATIONAL TASK FORCE ON CANNABIS REGULATION: REPORT ON THE
REGULATION AND TAXATION OF CANNABIS COMMERCE 1982 18-42 (1982). The bill
was introduced by Senator Milton Street in the Pennsylvania Senate as the Penn-
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Fourth, the term sometimes suggests a sophisticated system of
regulation with a variety of regulations and controls. An example
of a bill with a set of regulations and controls was introduced in the
New York Senate in 1988 (and re-introduced in 1989) by Senator
Joseph L. Galiber.93
Fifth, libertarians use the word "legalization" to indicate a pol-
icy of free-market distribution of drugs. Under a variation on this
type of legalization proposed by Ethan Nadelmann, drugs would be
available to adults by mail-order, to avoid local resales that would
offend local sensibilities.94 A pure libertarian, psychiatrist Thomas
Szasz, M.D., vehemently denounces those who, like myself, argue
for the legalization of drugs, for using the fourth meaning of legali-
zation. 95 Szasz argues that almost all of the advocates of legalization
simply argue for a different species of state control of drug distribu-
tion and use.96 He even characterized me as a "chemical
communist.97
Sixth, when used by opponents, the term "legalization" generally
refers to the libertarian, free-market model characterized as the un-
restrained, irresponsible and void-of-conscience distribution of dan-
gerous drugs to those who are vulnerable to being hurt by them.
Dr. Lee Brown, for example, sees legalization as the transformation
of society into an "open-air drug park," like the needle park that
operated for a year in Zurich.98 Advocates of legalization, it is said,
sylvania Marijuana Cultivation Act of 1983. Missouri Representative Elbert Walton
introduced a similar bill, H.B. 1820 in 1990.
93. S. 8176, introduced on April 18, 1988, would establish a State Controlled
Substances Authority of five members, authorized to regulate the manufacture of
controlled substances, to prohibit the sale of controlled substances in a time of
emergency, and to prescribe licenses. The bill was reintroduced in 1989 as S. 1918
and in 1995 as S. 4771. See Joseph Galiber, A Bill to Repeal Criminal Drug Laws:
Replacing Prohibition With Regulation, 18 HOFSTRA L. REv. 831-80 (1990); Nancy
Lord, A Practical Model for Drug Regulation, in DRUG POLICY 1989-1990: A RE-
FORMER'S CATALOGUE 371-99 (Arnold Trebach & Kevin Zeese eds., 1989).
94. See Ethan A. Nadelmann, Thinking Seriously About Alternatives to Drug Prohi-
bition, DAEDALUS, Summer 1992, at 85-132 (discussing possible variations to drug
legalization and their advantages against drug prohibition).
95. See generally SzAsz, OUR RIGHT To DRUGS, supra note 5. Szasz is a most
compelling and original thinker. His book CEREMONIAL CHEMISTRY, supra note 5, is
one of the most illuminating presentations about hidden issues in drug policy.
Other people who advocate the legalization of drugs in a similar fashion as I -
and attacked by Dr. Szasz - include Ethan Nadelmann, Judge Robert Sweet and
Lester Grinspoon, M.D.
96. See SzAsz, OUR RIGHT TO DRUGS, supra note 5, at 95-110.
97. Id. at 107.
98. Lee P. Brown, The Dangerous Illusions of Drug Legalization, WASH. TIMES,
May 24, 1994, at A19.
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have no plan and cannot answer questions about how they would
legalize drugs other than marijuana.
2. Medicalization
This term has been adopted by Baltimore Mayor Kurt Schmoke
and United States District Court Judge Robert Sweet, of the South-
ern District of New York, to refer to a policy where drug addicts
would be able to get drugs such as heroin, and maybe cocaine, from
a physician, a clinic or a special drug dispensary. 99 Dr. Arnold
Trebach suggests that medicalization would include studying
whether heroin addicts should be able to obtain medical grade her-
oin for maintenance,100 and whether drug addicts who inject drugs
should be able to get clean needles. 10 1 The essential feature of
medicalization is that the drug addict would not be criminally liable
for obtaining the drug from a licensed source. This is very similar
to the system of Dr. John Marks of the Merseyside Regional Health
Authority that serves Liverpool, England. 10 2
However, major elements of medicalization as advanced for
the United States are typically unclear. Would those who are "ad-
dicted" to barbiturates, amphetamines, Valium® or methaqualone
(Quaaludes®) also be able to get drugs from a non-physician
source? Would the addict be subject to any kind of dose limita-
tions? Could the addict get enough drug to "get high?" What
would be the relationship between the distribution scheme and
drug treatment?
The use of the term medicalization - and the policy it reflects
- is a politically more acceptable way of describing the fourth type
of legalization:1 0 3 the remedy is directed at those who currently
have "drug problems." Typically, this approach does not address
providing drugs to new initiates, which would remain illegal. In this
sense, it is also like decriminalization, described below. To my
99. Legalization Hearings, supra note 68, at 204 (stating that it would be up to
physicians to determine whether persons requesting drugs were addicts or not (tes-
timony of Kurt L. Schmoke, Mayor of Baltimore)).
100. TREBACH, THE HEROIN SOLUTION, supra note 5, at 292; TREBACH, THE
GREAT DRUG WAR, supra note 55, at 383-84.
101. TREBACH, THE GREAT DRUG WAR, supra note 5, at 384; see also Legalization
Hearings, supra note 68, at 205 (testimony of Kurt Schmoke, Mayor of Baltimore).
102. See, e.g., Legalization Hearings, supra note 68, at 555-62 (outlining method
used by facility to rehabilitate drug addicts (testimony of Russell Newcombe and
Allan Parry concerning the Merryside Harm-Reduction Model)).
103. For a discussion of the fourth type of legalization, see supra note 93 and
accompanying text.
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knowledge, however, no one has drafted a model medicalization
bill.
3. Harm Reduction
This term means that a drug regulatory approach's goal should
be to minimize the harms to which U.S. drug policy currently con-
tributes, such as continuing pain, spread of the AIDS virus, and
other conditions. The term is widely used in the Netherlands and
the United Kingdom, and is the subject of international confer-
ences. In application, this approach would include medical system
distribution of drugs, similar to medicalization, and the exchange
of clean needles. This approach, although less often, would also
include the distribution of marijuana for medical purposes. The
prime value of this approach is in public health protection, not pro-
tection of civil liberties, establishment of public order, or crime
control. Its model is the distribution of condoms and safer sex edu-
cation for prevention of the spread of sexually transmitted diseases,
or the installation of seat belts in automobiles.
4. Decriminalization
This term was used in the recommendation regarding mari-
juana made by the National Commission on Marijuana and Drug
Abuse (known as the Shafer Commission, appointed by President
Nixon) in its first report. 10 4 In that context, decriminalization
meant: "Possession of marihuana for personal use would no longer
be an offense, but marihuana possessed in public would remain
contraband subject to summary seizure and forfeiture. Casual dis-
tribution of small amounts of marihuana for no renumeration, or
insignificant renumeration not involving profit would no longer be
an offense."10 5 The Shafer Commission thought decriminalization
would benefit the Unites States by:
" symbolizing a continued societal discouragement of use;
" facilitating the deemphasis of marihuana essential to an-
swering dispassionately so many of the unanswered
questions;
" permitting a simultaneous medical, educational, reli-
gious and parental effort to concentrate on reducing ir-
responsible use, and remedying its consequences;
104. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON MARIJUANA AND DRUG ABUSE, MARIJUANA: A
SIGNAL OF MISUNDERSTANDING 150-52 (1972).
105. Id. at 152.
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* removing the criminal stigma and the threat of incarcer-
ation from a widespread behavior (possession for per-
sonal use) which does not warrant such treatment;
" relieving the law enforcement community of the respon-
sibility for enforcing a law of questionable utility and dif-
ficult enforcement, thereby allowing concentration on
drug trafficking and other more serious crimes;
* relieving the judicial calendar of a large volume of mari-
huana possession cases which delay the processing of
more serious cases; and
" maximizing the flexibility of future public responses as
new information comes to light.10 6
In the mid-1970s, the National Organization for the Reform of
Marijuana Laws (NORML) also advanced decriminalization.
NORML argued that the United States should not subject mari-
juana users to the indignity, expense, stigma and numerous other
consequences of being arrested for a misdemeanor or felony. In-
stead, the United States should eliminate arrests, arrest records and
imprisonment of those who possessed small amounts (personal use
quantities) of marijuana. The group argued that marijuana use is
not a serious offense. 10 7
Under the decriminalization laws of eleven states, a person
found by the police to be in possession of less than one ounce of
marijuana (50 or 100 grams in some states) typically is issued a cita-
tion and faces a maximum penalty of a fine, ranging from $100 to
$500.108 However, these state laws did not legalize cultivation, sale
or importation of marijuana, which remained felonies. There is no
evidence that marijuana use increased in "decrim" states, or that
marijuana use decreased more slowly than in non-decriminalization
states. 109
106. Id. at 150.
107. See, e.g., RIcHARD J. BONNIE, MARIJUANA USE AND CRIMINAL SANCTIONS:
ESSAYS ON THE THEORY AND PRACrICE OF DECRIMINALIZATION 43-59 (1980).
108. Id. at 49. Decriminalization laws were adopted by Alaska, California, Col-
orado, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, Ohio
and Oregon, between 1971 and 1979. See ALAsKA STAT. § 17.12.010 (repealed
1982); CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 11357 (West 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-
22-412 (repealed 1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2383 (West 1964); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 152.15 (West 1989) (repealed 1989); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-29-139,
41-29-149 (1972 & Supp. 1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-416(9) (Supp. 1992); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 221.05 (McKinney 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-95 (1994); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2925.03 (Supp. 1994); OR. REv. STAT. § 167.202 (1971) (repealed
1977).
109. D. Maloff, A Review of the Effects of the Decriminalization of Marijuana, 10
CONTEMPORARY DRUG PROBLEMS 307, 308 (1981) (reporting that decriminalization
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The principal drawback of decriminalization is that it protects
the demand side of a criminal market, leaving the supply side in
criminal hands. One scholarly analyst, concluded that: decriminal-
ization is likely to prove to be the worst of all possible policies when
it comes to the drug-dealing aspect of the marijuana problem. Ad-
ding more demand to a multibillion-dollar illicit industry will have
disadvantages: more untaxed income, more economic activity
outside legal control, and probably more corruption and
violence.110
Today, the narrow meaning of the term decriminalization
given by the Shafer Commission is not typically used. As one writer
pointed out, "decriminalization is in some ways a compromise be-
tween maintaining prohibition and full legalization.""' Thus, the
word is sometimes used as a synonym for a heavily regulated form
of legalization or medicalization. Under this type of policy, the
drug user is not subject to criminal sanction for his or her use.
Although eleven states passed marijuana decriminalization laws be-
tween 1973 and 1979, no bills to decriminalize at the federal level
have been introduced since the 96th Congress in 1979-1980.112
5. Prohibition
This term accurately describes the status quo. Individuals are
prohibited from using drugs, even in the privacy of their own
homes. They are prohibited from growing drug plants such as ma-
rijuana, poppies or coca for their own use, even if there is no affect
upon interstate or foreign commerce. Physicians are prohibited
from prescribing marijuana or heroin for any medical purpose to
sick or dying persons who might benefit from those drugs. Sick
persons are prohibited from using drugs like marijuana to maintain
their vision or to control their pain or spasticity, even when they
find that marijuana is the only drug that is effective with minimal or
of marijuana in Oregon did not lead to a substantial increase in use); id. at 320-21
(revealing study of 11 states that have decriminalized or substantially reduced pen-
alties for marijuana use found, at most, only a minimal effect on consumption).
110. MARK KLEaimN, AGAINST ExcEss 269 (1992).
111. Id.; see also Legalization Hearings, supra note 68, at 180-211 (recording tes-
timony of Kurt Schmoke, Mayor of Baltimore, concerning his 1988 "decriminaliza-
tion" proposal).
112. See S. 1722, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 6915, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1980). The House subcommittee on criminal justice recommended reduced pen-
alties for the possession of small quantities of marijuana. H.R. REP. No. 1396, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess., at 386 n.2 (1980). However, the full House Judiciary Committee
acted to restore the current law penalty despite this recommendation. Id.
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acceptable side effects.1 13
Current law in the United States is erroneously designated as a
policy of "controlled substances." The traffic and use of most of the
drugs listed in the act is, in reality, out of control. Even though the
overwhelming bulk of regulated drugs are distributed and con-
sumed in an orderly manner, it is hardly accurate to describe the
status quo regarding schedule I and many schedule II drugs as
"drug control."
The term "prohibition" brings to mind the problems and his-
torical lessons of alcohol prohibition: the growth of organized
crime, widespread corruption, violence, disrespect for the law, lost
tax revenue, jeopardized civil liberties and rapid growth of law en-
forcement enterprises. These problems are also a part of today's
drug prohibition status quo. Ironically, however, alcohol prohibi-
tion at the federal level was very similar to the decriminalization
policy recommended by the Shafer Commission - personal use
was not subject to federal prosecution.
D. Current Drug Enforcement Paradigm
A crime is committed. An investigation is commenced. Wit-
nesses are interviewed and evidence is collected. A suspect is identi-
fied and charged. A trial is conducted. In most instances, a
conviction is obtained. A sentence is imposed. Justice is done. For
centuries, it is these steps that constituted the processes of the crim-
inal justice system.
After a great deal of drug enforcement, however, the United
States has streamlined this process. Now, a suspect is identified
first.'1 4 Next, an investigation is commenced and evidence is gath-
ered. And, then, at the appropriate moment, the crime is finally
committed. 115 After the commission of the crime, the suspect may
be apprehended, charged, almost certainly convicted and definitely
sentenced.
When the government investigates important drug cases, it typ-
113. See LESTER GRINSPOON AND JAMES B. BAKALAR, MARIHUANA, THE FORBID-
DEN MEDICINE 24 (1993) (describing research into medical conditions for which
marijuana has value).
114. See Chapman, Does the Punishment Fit the Crime?, supra note 1, at Al1. Mr.
Chapman details the arrest and conviction of Keith Edwards, "a 19-year-old, small-
time New York City drug dealer." Id. First, law enforcement agents set up a trap.
Id. Then, Mr. Edwards committed his crime and was arrested. Id. He was then
sentenced to 10 years of prison under a mandatory minimum law. Id.
115. Id.
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ically follows this streamlined process.116 At a Christmas party at
the headquarters of the DEA in the mid-1980s, I was standing with
Dave Westrate, a top DEA executive, who was conversing with re-
porters from the Washington Post and USA Today. The Post reporter
asked Mr. Westrate, "Why do you like drug enforcement?" The
DEA executive replied, "What I like about drug enforcement is that
the government gets to control the commission of the crime." In
other words, at the time that a drug seller makes the deal with a
government agent, the government simultaneously obtains the evi-
dence necessary to obtain a conviction for the commission of a
crime. Those words, "the government gets to control the commis-
sion of the crime," describe one of the most corrosive aspects of the
enforcement of drug prohibition: the effective, "proactive" en-
forcement of drug laws requires the government to create the
crimes that are going to be prosecuted.
It is interesting to note that those who oppose the current U.S.
drug policy include representatives of a wide variety of ideologies.
The most outspoken opponents are libertarians. They are well-rep-
resented by Thomas Szasz, M.D. 117
Other opponents to prohibition can be classified ideologically
as contemporary liberals. They have concluded that drug prohibi-
tion as a policy, after a cost-benefit analysis, creates more harm than
it ameliorates. Perhaps Baltimore Mayor Kurt L. Schmoke, might
be identified in this position. My proposal is outlined in Part VI of
this article. 118
Still other critics of prohibition include well-known ideological
conservatives. For example, William F. Buckley, Richard Brook-
hiser and former Secretary of State George P. Shultz fall into this
group of anti-prohibitionists.
116. See ARTHUR D. HILLMAN, LAWS AGAINST MARIJUANA: THE PRICE WE PAY
60-168 (1975) (stating "the most valuable tools in the enforcement of marijuana
laws are undercover agents and informers and the deceptive practices that are an
essential part of their activities"). Naturally, investigations into "opportunistic"
cases, where a drug possessor is accidentally apprehended in a motor vehicle stop,
or a street comer dope dealer is apprehended at the scene, proceed in the histori-
cal manner.
117. See generally SzAsz, OUR RIGHT TO DRUGS, supra note 5.
118. Dr. Szasz, however, has virulently attacked my approach to legalization,
even characterizing it as "chemical statism iiber alles." Id. at 107.
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V. CASE HISTORIES
A. History of the Mandatory Minimum Sentences of the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986
The Controlled Substances Act (Act) sentencing provisions
were completed by the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime on
August 12, 1986, just five weeks after the initial announcement that
an anti-drug bill was to be developed.119 Events prior to the final
proposal of this Act elucidate why this bill was completed in such an
unusually short time and why the fundamental flaws of the Act were
not corrected.
The shocking drug-related death of National Collegiate Ath-
letic Association (NCAA) basketball star Len Bias brought the U.S.
drug problem to the forefront of the nation's attention. 120 During
the Fourth-of-July recess at home in Boston, the Speaker of the
House, Thomas P. "Tip" O'Neill, Jr., was confronted with constitu-
ent shock over Bias' death. When he returned to Washington, he
announced that the House Democrats would develop an omnibus
anti-drug bill. 121 He set a five-week deadline for the conclusion of
all committee work on this bill.
The development of this particular bill was extraordinary. Typ-
ically, members of the House introduce bills which are referred to a
subcommittee. Then, hearings are held on the bills where com-
ment is invited from the Administration, the Judicial Conference,
and other organizations and the affected public that have expertise
or opinions on the issue. Next, a "markup" is held on a bill.
Amendments are then offered and, lastly, a clean bill is re-intro-
duced and accompanied with a report. However, for this particular
bill, much of the above procedure was circumvented. In essence,
the careful, deliberate procedures of Congress were set aside in or-
der to expedite passage of the bill. 122
119. H.R. REP. No. 845, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 11 (1986).
120. Roy S. Johnson, All-American Basketball Star, Celtic Choice, Dies Suddenly,
N.Y. TIMEs,June 20, 1986, at Al. Len Bias died onJune 19, 1986, after an overdose
of alcohol and cocaine. Id. He was celebrating his new contract with the Boston
Celtics. Id.
121. The House Democrats had hoped that the introduction of this bill would
preempt crime and drug issues from the Republicans, who had used these issues
very effectively in the 1984 election. However, the preemptive effort failed because
the Republicans responded with proposed amendments for longer sentences,
death penalty provisions and elimination of the exclusionary rule to enforce
Fourth Amendment protection against warrantless or unreasonable searches and
seizures.
122. The development of this mandatory sentencing bill was the sole in-
stance, during the eight years that I served as a staff member of the Subcommittee
408 [Vol. 40: p. 383
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Notwithstanding the intensity of this legislative haste, it is testi-
mony to the integrity of the Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Crime, William J. Hughes, a Democrat from New Jersey, that the
subcommittee attempted to develop a new sentencing scheme for
drug offenses in a rational manner in the amount of time available.
The subcommittee determined that it wanted to create incentives
for the Department of Justice to direct its "most intense focus" on
"major traffickers, the manufacturers or the heads of organizations,
who are responsible for creating and delivering very large quanti-
ties of drugs."1 23
In pursuit of this goal, the subcommittee directed its staff to
consult "with a number of DEA agents and prosecutors about the
distribution patterns of drugs which if possessed by an individual
would likely be indicative of operating at such a high level."1 24 Fur-
thermore, the subcommittee "determined that a second level of fo-
cus ought to be on the managers of the retail level traffic, the
person who is filling the bags of heroin, packaging crack into vials
or wrapping pcp [sic] in aluminum foil, and doing so in substantial
street quantities."12 5
The above concepts, and implementation plans for these con-
cepts, were developed during four meetings of the subcommittee.
To determine appropriate quantity thresholds for classification pur-
poses, the subcommittee tried several approaches. First, the sub-
committee consulted individual law enforcement officers for their
input based on personal experience. They also considered the clas-
sification system used by the DEA to classify the most serious traf-
fickers. Finally, however, the subcommittee adjusted the quantity
thresholds, on the basis of individual member's perceptions of what
quantity of drugs constituted an important drug case in their
jurisdiction. 126
In attempting to develop appropriate quantity thresholds, the
subcommittee did not determine the relative harmfulness of differ-
ent drugs. The subcommittee failed to develop a "harmfulness
equivalent" among drugs so that quantities of drugs subject to the
same level of punishment would reflect an equivalent measure of
on Crime, that I did not see the usual procedure of the introduction of a bill and
subsequent hearings on it followed by the subcommittee.
123. H.R. REP. No. 845, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 11-12 (1986).
124. Id. at 12.
125. Id.
126. This ad hoc process decreased the required quantities for major level
traffickers in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (A) (1988). Furthermore, this process de-
parted from a national or international classification standard.
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social harm or transgression. Rather, the subcommittee geared
punishment levels to crude assessments of what constituted "major"
and "serious" traffickers.
Without a determination of the relative harmfulness of various
drugs, the resulting legislation did not take into account degrees of
danger posed to society by different drugs and differing distribu-
tion patterns. For example, it did not consider that the number of
transactions between LSD chemists and consumers is far fewer than
between heroin chemists and consumers. 12 7 Further, it necessarily
assumed that a high-level LSD distributor inflicts the equivalent so-
cial harm as a high-level heroin, cocaine or PCP distributor.
In determining the appropriate length of minimum and maxi-
mum sentences, the subcommittee's approach contained funda-
mental flaws. Some members of the subcommittee erroneously
believed that unfettered judicial discretion in the federal system was
a problem that needed to be addressed. They mistakenly believed
that parole still existed at the federal level.128 Further, the subcom-
mittee did not consult any of the agencies that had expertise in the
sentencing area, such as the Bureau of Prisons, the Parole Commis-
sion, the new United States Sentencing Commission 29 or the Judi-
cial Conference. Finally, the subcommittee set the sentencing
thresholds on the uninformed impressions of what its members
thought were high-level or important traffickers. The underlying
purpose was to direct the Department of Justice to concentrate its
prosecutions on high-level and major traffickers.130
As flawed was the work of the Subcommittee on Crime in de-
veloping the mandatory minimum sentences, however, it was much
more deliberative than the overall Congressional environment in
which the anti-drug legislation was being considered in August,
September and October of 1986.
The terrible consequences of mandatory minimum sentences
are now well known to the Judiciary, the Bureau of Prisons, the Bar,
127. LSD is manufactured in the United States and distributed in relatively
tight networks. Heroin is manufactured principally in Thailand, Pakistan, Afghani-
stan, Mexico and Colombia, and resold repeatedly as it moves to the U.S. market.
128. Parole was abolished by the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-473, 98 Stat. 2027 (1984) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 3624 (1994)).
129. The United States Sentencing Commission was created by the Sentenc-
ing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984) (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1988)). The Sentencing Commission was, at the
time, developing a sentencing guideline structure. However, the subcommittee set
sentence levels without regard to the effect on the Sentencing Commission's
efforts.
130. H.R. REP. No. 845, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12, 16-17 (1986).
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and the nation at large. Congress recognized this problem in 1990
and requested a study of mandatory minimum sentences. 31 In Au-
gust of 1991, the United States Sentencing Commission issued its
report to Congress on mandatory minimum sentences. 132 The
Commission concluded that the adoption of the mandatory mini-
mum sentences had frustrated the very purpose of the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984 by "creat[ing] unwarranted disparity in sen-
tencing."13 3 The disparate application of the mandatory minimum
sentences seemed to discriminate against non-whites. Moreover,
the Fifth Circuit District Judges Association found that mandatory
minimum sentences "often require[d] the imposition of sentences
which [were] manifestly unjust."' 34
Contrary to the subcommittee's original intent, the imposition
of mandatory minimum sentences for small quantities of drugs has
encouraged the DEA and other federal law enforcement agencies
to prosecute relatively easy targets - low level dealers. Thus, these
federal agencies are squandering their time and resources on the
most easily replaced component of the drug hierarchy. Further-
more, these low-level dealers are typically poor, black, urban youth.
In support of the above contention, the United States Sentenc-
ing Commission's special report to Congress, in 1995, concluded
that 59.6% of crack cocaine defendants sent to federal prison were
street-level operators, 13 5 and overall, 88% were black.136 Addition-
ally, 39% of powder cocaine defendants were just local-area opera-
tors.137 In total, over 40% of federal drug defendants were local-
area operators' 3 8 and 66% were either street-level operators or
"mules." 3 9 Surprisingly, only 11.2% of federal drug defendants
131. Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1703, 104 Star. 4805-
46 (1990).
132. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS:
MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1991)
(responding to statutory directive that Sentencing Commission examine compati-
bility of sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimum penalties, effect of
mandatory minimums on federal system, and alternatives to mandatory minimums
for Congress to direct sentencing policy).
133. Id. at ii.
134. Id. at G-10. Appendix G sets forth the resolutions of the Judicial Confer-
ence and the twelve Circuit Courts of Appeals, which were all critical of mandatory
minimum sentences.
135. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: COCAINE
AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 172 tbl. 18 (1995) [hereinafter U.S. SENTENCING
COMMISSION: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY].
136. Id. at 161 tbl. 13.
137. Id. at 170 tbl. 17.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 172 tbl. 18.
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were high-level operators. 140 These statistics reflect an enormous
waste of federal resources, which have been channelled into prose-
cuting relatively minor offenders.
B. The 1994 Crime Bill141 and the Debate Over Longer Sentences and
More Prisons: How Much is Enough?
As the value of crime as a political issue has grown in the past
dozen years, so too has the debate about more prisons and longer
sentencing. The political value of longer sentencing fully blos-
somed in 1993 with a Washington State initiative (passed on No-
vember 2, 1993) - a mandate of life imprisonment without parole
after three convictions for serious felonies. The next day, the
United States Senate began consideration of an omnibus anti-crime
bill, without a day of hearings. 142
Senator Biden, Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary,
introduced the original Democratic bill, 143 which provided for $200
million in grants to states for corrections. Senator Hatch intro-
duced the Republican bill, 144 which provided for $3 billion for pris-
ons - $2 billion for construction of new federal prisons and $1
billion for grants to operate and maintain state prisons. The Demo-
crats responded with a new bill;145 designed to match the Republi-
can bill, it authorized $2 billion in grants for state boot camp
prisons or regional prisons.
While some senators were engaged in conferences behind
closed doors about the level of spending, firearms provisions and
the death penalty, other senators simply added amendments as the
thought occurred. Often, these amendments were triggered by the
current day's news. Consider the crime of arson, for example. Sen-
ator Dole watched the Cable News Network (CNN) one night and,
after seeing wild fires raging in California and hearing the Gover-
nor of California discussing arson, offered an amendment to
double the maximum sentences and the mandatory minimum
sentences for the federal crimes of arson.' 46
140. Id.
141. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
142. 139 CONG. REc. S14,940 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1993) (statement of Sen.
Hatch). S. 1607 was 471 pages when introduced and 960 pages on November 19
when finally passed.
143. S. 1488, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
144. S. 1356, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
145. S. 1607, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
146. In his explanation, the Senator Dole did not mention doubling
412 [Vol. 40: p. 383
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On November 4, 1993, Senator Byrd, the then-Chairman of the
Appropriations Committee, offered an amendment to transfer
$22.268 billion to a violent crime trust fund.147 The newly hatched
amendment, Senator Byrd explained, would spend $3 billion for
federal construction of regional prisons for mostly state prisoners,
$1 billion for construction of jails, boot camps and other state and
local correctional facilities, and $500 million for secure juvenile fa-
cilities.148 For some reason, the amendment as printed included $2
billion - not $1 billion - for boot camps and state prisons.' 49
Nevertheless, within a few hours, the amendment overwhelmingly
passed. 150
On November 8, 1993, less than a week after the "three strikes
and you're out" initiative, Senator Gramm introduced an amend-
ment to impose life imprisonment on drug felons and violent
criminals convicted for a third time. 15 1 Senator Hatch offered a
substitute. 152 The result was complete confusion.153 A few minutes
later, after adopting an amendment to allow parents to be sen-
tenced to community service for the crimes of their minor children,
the "three strikes and you're out" amendment was brought up and
passed without any further debate or a recorded vote.' 54 Appar-
ently, no deliberation could be too short and no proposal too far-
reaching, once the Senate undertook a "serious" effort to be "tough
on crime."
But the touchstone of the toughness in Congress was more im-
prisonment. $5.5 billion for more prisons had been the high bid by
the end of the Senate consideration. A number of organizations
mandatory minimum sentences from five years to 10 years and from 10 years to 20
years. 139 CONG. REc. S15,027 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1993).
Senator Feinstein stated, without offering any evidentiary support, "[t] here is
no question that the current penalties for arson are not sufficient to deter this
crime .... Hopefully, enhanced penalties of this kind will send a signal, both in
California and elsewhere, that the people of this country are not going to tolerate
this kind of behavior." Id. at S15,028. The amendment then passed on voice vote.
Id. at S15,051 (as codified in 18 U.S.C. § 844(f), (h)-(i) (1994)).
147. 139 CONG. REc. S15,030 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1993) (statement of Sen.
Byrd).
148. Id.
149. Id. at S15,052.
150. Id. at S15,070 (stating that amendment passed by vote of 94-4, with two
Senators not voting).
151. 139 CONG. REc. S15,342-43 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1993) (amendment no.
1130 offered by Sen. Gramm).
152. Id. at S15,282-83 (amendment no. 1131 offered by Sen. Hatch).
153. Senator Biden embodied the mood of the day when he uttered, "I want
to figure out what is going on. I yield the floor." Id. at S15,284.
154. Id. at S15,286.
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have recently issued reports proclaiming the need for more pris-
ons.1 55 The main contention of these reports is that more impris-
onment is needed; therefore, more prisons are needed. Notably
lacking is an analysis of exactly how many prisons should be con-
structed. These reports simply argue for "more."
The reports extolling the benefits of more prisons are all
founded on a similar premise, that crime is a much more serious
problem today than it was in the past.1 56 However, this premise is
built upon a shaky foundation of misused facts and data.' 57 The
Republican "Contract with America," for example, states that
"[e]very year, nearly five million people are victims of violent
crime."1 58 What the report fails to mention is that over 50% of the
"violent crime" incidents were just simple assault cases. 159 Further-
more, over 25% of the assaults were not even reported to the police
because the victims characterized the assaults as "private or per-
sonal matter[s] ."160 Of course, the commission of an assault is a
serious matter; however, it is not a compelling argument for con-
structing more prisons to house perpetrators of simple assaults,
25% of which are not reported to the police.
155. See, e.g., HOUSE REPUBLICAN CONFERENCE, CONTRACT WITH AMERICA
(1994) [hereinafter HouSE REPUBLICAN CONFERENCE] (arguing for construction of
more prisons); AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL, REPORT CARD ON CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT (1994) [hereinafter AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL]
(same); NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION CRIMESTRIKE, THE CASE FOR BUILDING MORE
PRISONS (1994) (same).
156. See, e.g., AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL, supra note 155, at 10
("Perhaps never before in history had Americans experienced such a collapse of
social order. Never before had the fear of crime so altered their lives."). However,
studies indicate that numerous periods during the early and mid-19th century
were quite violent, although not as violent as the 1980s, thus refuting the American
Legislative Exchange Council's generalized assertions. See Fox Butterfield, Histori-
cal Study of Homicide and Cities Surprises the Experts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1994, at Al 6
(noting violent periods during 19th century); ROGER LANE, ROOTS OF VIOLENCE IN
BLACK PHILADELPHIA 2-3 (1986) (same); ROGER LANE, VIOLENT DEATH IN THE CrIy:
SUICIDE, ACCIDENT, AND MURDER IN NINETEENTH CENTURY PHILADELPHIA 7-8 (1979)
(noting that in Philadelphia, before Civil War, young gangs "terrorized honest citi-
zens while battling with each other").
157. See, e.g., HOUSE REPUBLICAN CONFERENCE, supra note 155, at 6 (citing ex-
pert estimating that "20-year old black male has a greater chance of being mur-
dered on the streets than a soldier in World War II stood of dying in combat").
The misuse of facts and data is profoundly exemplified by the fact that this ex-
pert's estimate was made in 1974 - 20 years earlier. AMERICAN LEGISLATIVE Ex-
CHANGE COUNCIL, supra note 155, at 10.
158. HOUSE REPUBLICAN CONFERENCE, supra note 155, at 6.
159. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 246 tbl. 3.1 (1993) [hereinafter BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS]. In 1992, there were 6.6 million victims of violent crime; 3.4 million
were simple assault cases. Id.
160. Id. at 254 tbl. 3.8.
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As enacted, the 1994 Crime Bill includes $8.8 billion for state
and local police officers, $7.9 billion for new prison construction
and more than $5 billion for so-called crime prevention pro-
grams. 161 Yet, the Contract with America argues that the Crime Bill
essentially failed to address the U.S.'s fundamental crime prob-
lem. 162 Not surprisingly, the Contract with America's solution is to
spend more money on new prison construction - an additional
$2.6 billion and eliminate crime prevention and police pro-
grams.1 63 Setting aside the rhetoric of the Contract with America,
how can anyone conclude that a quantitative difference of $2.6 bil-
lion in new prison construction will amount to a qualitative differ-
ence in addressing the "fundamental crime problem in our
country"?
VI. THE FOUNDATIONS OF A REALISTIC DRUG STRATEGY: TwELE
PRINCIPALS FOR MANAGING THE DRUG PROBLEM
The United States needs to implement a more realistic drug
strategy. The most effective program would recognize individual
rights as well as responsibilities, respect civil liberties, strengthen
our nation's economy, and be committed to achieving public safety.
To accomplish these goals, we must entrust regulation of the drug
business to the rule of law. Accordingly, the strategy should take
the drug business out of the hands of criminals, turn it over to con-
sumers and law-abiding business people, and subject it to appropri-
ate regulation.
In pursuit of a more realistic drug policy, I propose twelve prin-
ciples to guide the United States drug policy:
(1) Insist upon genuine drug and alcohol user accountability and
responsibility.
People who hurt or endanger others must be held responsible
for their actions. Drug or alcohol use is not an excuse for criminal
or negligent conduct. In critical safety situations (i.e. pilots, drivers
or physicians), we should require performance tests to detect actual
impairment by drugs, legal and illegal and exhaustion or other
cause of impaired performance. Following any kind of accident, it
would be perfectly appropriate to immediately test the blood of pi-
lots, engineers, bus drivers and surgeons for evidence of alcohol or
161. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 13701 (1994).
162. See generally HOUSE REPUBLICAN CONFERENCE, supra note 155.
163. Id.
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other drug use. This would be appropriate not only for transporta-
tion accidents, but also for medical accidents, such as administering
medications improperly or making mistakes in surgery. However, it
would not be appropriate to use tests showing past use of drugs to
determine current safety qualifications*or to deny licenses to those
who have used drugs in the past without also showing a proximate
threat to safety.
The United States should encourage increased professional re-
sponsibility and peer supervision of professional fields such as
medicine and airline piloting, to police against on-the-job reckless-
ness involving alcohol or drug use. Suspected misconduct that
threatens public safety must be investigated and prosecuted where
criminal recklessness has occurred.
Drug and alcohol use should be considered privileges. Drug
use may be subject to licensing, which can be revoked for misuse.
This idea has been suggested by Mark A. R. Kleiman at the Kennedy
School.' 64 Persons who use drugs or alcohol could even be re-
quired to get special liability insurance coverage. It should not be
presumed that persons over twenty-one years of age are responsible
alcohol or drug users.
(2) Insist upon vender accountability and responsibility.
Violence, corruption, product adulteration, tax evasion, illegal
campaign contributions and antitrust violations by drug, alcohol
and tobacco sellers are crimes that the United States should investi-
gate and punish. Adulteration and mislabelling of drugs and alco-
hol should also be subject to product liability civil law remedies.
Vendors must be required to comply with reasonable regulations
and inspections, pay taxes, and resolve market place conflicts
through utilization of the law, not violence. Compliance with these
requirements could be more easily investigated and enforced in a
regulated environment than under prohibition.
Further, bans on sales to minors of tobacco, alcohol and other
drugs must be enforced. Sales to those who have lost their alcohol
or drug use privileges should be prohibited. Like alcohol dram-
shop laws, over-the-counter sales of drugs to those who are already
intoxicated should not be permitted. Promotion of alcohol, to-
bacco and drug use should be severely limited.
164. KLEIMAN, supra note 110, at 98-101, 249-52, 277-79.
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(3) Set appropriate priorities and undertake achievable social goals.
The United States should minimize the harms and maximize
the benefits of drug and alcohol use. In 1995, the principle harms
to reduce in the near term are the spread of AIDS, trafficking vio-
lence, corruption - domestically and internationally - and tax
evasion. All of these harms are exacerbated by prohibition.
165
Part of setting appropriate priorities requires that we refocus
domestic law enforcement by both refocusing crime prevention
and corrections policies. We must make crime prevention a com-
munity-oriented policing effort, making the streets safer and
preventing crime by involving the community in the policing ef-
fort.166 State and local law enforcement and prosecutors should
concentrate on directing drug trafficking indoors, off the street and
out of residential neighborhoods, commercial districts during busi-
ness hours, playgrounds, parks and schools.
167
Our corrections policy must be reformed by assuring that re-
peat, serious, violent offenders are incarcerated. Record keeping
must be automated and accurate to assure that repeat offenders are
identified and not mistakenly released. Prisons, however, should
not be used for simple drug possessors and users, or for non-violent
165. See THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY 1 (1989)
[hereinafter NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY] (stating that "intravenous drug
use is now the single largest source of new HIV/AIDS virus infections" and "[t]he
number of drug related emergency hospital admissions increased by 121[%] be-
tween 1985 and 1988"); see also HODDING CARTER III, We're Losing the Drug War
Because Prohibition Never Works, in DRUG LEGALIZATION: FOR AND AGAINST 91, 92
(Rod L. Evans & Irwin M. Berent eds., 1992) (stating that net profits for drug
traffickers is estimated at $40-$100 billion per year and that prohibition creates
competition for these profits); WILLIAMJ. CHAMBLISS, The Consequences of Prohibition:
Crime, Corruptions, and International Narcotics Contro in DRUGS, LAW AND THE STATE
15-32 (Harold H. Traver & Mark S. Gaylord eds., 1992) (stating that history of
drug prohibition suggests that some form of legalization is only way to deal ration-
ally with drug problem).
166. See James Q. Wilson & George Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and
Neighborhood Safety, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29-38 (pointing out that
rules of street can affect crime rate).
167. Drug-free school zones can be accomplished by sustained enforcement
in and around schools and by heightened sentencing for sales that take place at
schools as a matter of prosecutorial policy. However, enforcement operations that
lure traffickers to make cocaine into "crack" to deliver into school zones to create
longer sentencing have been properly characterized by judges as "sentencing en-
trapment" and "sentencing manipulation" and are unjust and dishonest. See
United States v.Jones, 18 F.3d 1145, 1153 (4th Cir. 1994) (" [S] entencing manipu-
lation [is] outrageous government conduct that offends due process."); United
States v. Barth, 990 F.2d 422, 424 (8th Cir. 1993) ("[S]entencing entrapment [is]
outrageous conduct which overcomes the will of an individual predisposed only to
dealing in small quantities for the purpose of increasing the amount of drugs and
the resulting sentencing of the entrapped defendant.").
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drug offenders. Unfortunately, 21% of the federal prison popula-
tion is now non-violent, first-time drug offenders.168 These offend-
ers should have their sentencing commuted to community
supervision.
In addition, we need to strengthen international law enforce-
ment. The United States Department of Justice and Treasury
should devote greater attention to the highest-level and interna-
tional traffickers, arms dealers and money laundered whose vio-
lence and corruption is undermining governments and the global
financial system. These are complex cases requiring the reassign-
ment of law enforcement agents and prosecutors away from minor
level offenders. Currently, the majority of the productivity of
United States law enforcement is the imprisonment if street-level
dealers, bodyguards and couriers (55.2%), and only a very small
fraction are high-level dealers (11.2%) or international scope traf-
fickers (23.7%).169
Addiction and intoxication, per se, are less serious harms;170
thus, reducing them should be an important, but secondary goal.
As we have witnessed in public health campaigns addressing to-
bacco, alcohol and physical fitness, well-designed education and so-
cial controls are very effective and critically important as prevention
programs.
A tertiary goal should be to obtain revenue from commerce in
drugs and alcohol to help cover social costs. Even at today's low
rate, alcohol taxation raised more than $12 billion in 1989.171 Tax-
ing marijuana as we do alcohol or tobacco could raise $10-20 bil-
168. An internal Department ofJustice report was prepared for then-Attorney
General Philip Heymann in 1993. It revealed that 16,300 federal prisoners at that
time were "low-level" drug offenders with no record of violence, no involvement in
sophisticated criminal activity and no serious prior convictions. "These 16,300 -
21% of the entire federal drug prisoners - were serving an average of six years in
prison." Stuart Taylor, Jr., Courage, Cowardice on Drug Sentencing, LEGAL TIMES, Apr.
24, 1995, at 27.
169. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY,
supra note 135, at 172 tbl. 18.
170. Dr. Dawn Day has estimated the risk of African-Americans dying from
AIDS at 14,400 new cases per year in 1994, compared to 2000 overdose deaths of
African-Americans in 1992. DAWN DAY, HEALTH EMERGENCY: THE SPREAD OF DRUG-
RELATED AIDS AMONG AFRICAN-AMERICANS AND LATINOS 4, 18-20 (Oct. 11 1995).
This statistic was based on her analysis of drug-induced mortality data from the
National Center for Disease Prevention and Control in Atlanta, Georgia. Id.
171. INSTITUTE FOR HEALTH POLICY, BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY, SUBSTANCE ABUSE:
THE NATION'S NUMBER ONE HEALTH PROBLEM 54 (1993) [hereinafter SUBSTANCE
ABUSE] (noting that federal and state tobacco excise taxes raised more than $11
billion in Fiscal Year 1992).
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lion yearly for the states and federal government.172
(4) Recognize that there are no magic solutions.
The problems of crime, violence and drug abuse in the United
States cannot be easily solved. There will be addicts and crime no
matter what we do. Although we must change our strategy, we must
do so cautiously. A regulatory, management-style approach to the
myriad of drug problems should be tailored to specific issues and
adopted incrementally.
Discussions of these complex problems should be free of exces-
sive rhetoric and simplistic approaches such as prohibition. Prohi-
bition has failed to reduce crime or addiction, and a "drug-free"
society seems totally unrealistic.' 73 Prohibition's concomitant strat-
egy of punishing drug addicts is akin to expelling from school stu-
dents with learning disabilities. To attempt to take the profits out
of a $50 billion per year business through the forfeiture of $750
million in property per year is absurd.1 74 Even sales taxes would be
more effective.
A good example of a complex drug regulatory scheme is alco-
hol regulation. Alcohol regulation has constantly evolved since
1933 and is still changing today. There are countless alcohol laws
currently in existence, reflecting multiple goals from revenue col-
lection to reducing consumption. Alcohol-focused laws extensively
regulate its sale, advertising, taxation, places of distribution and
consumption; further, they vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction de-
pending on whether the substance is beer, wine or whiskey.' 75 Of
172. See Nadelman, The Case for Legalization, supra note 87, at 23 (stating that
legalization of drugs would bring into public treasuries "at least $10 billion per
year and possibly much more"); NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY, supra note
165, at 2 (stating that estimated gross drug sales total $110 billion per year, "more
than our total gross agricultural income and more than double the profits enjoyed
by all the Fortune 500 companies combined"); NATIONAL GOVERNOR'S CONFERENCE
CENTER FOR POLICY RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS, MARJUANA: A STUDY OF STATE PoLI-
CIES AND PENALTIES 38 (1977) (stating that drug users spend approximately $4 bil-
lion annually on marijuana and that 50% of amount spent is profit to seller).
173. Congress directed the establishment of a "National Commission on Mea-
sured Responses to Achieve a Drug-Free America by 1995" in section 7604 of the
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4508-4510.
174. See NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL STRATEGY, supra note 165, at 77, 164 (re-
porting that Department ofJustice Asset Forfeitures in 1993 were $555.7 million,
and Department of Treasury Asset Forfeitures were $168 million; and that costs in
1993 to Department of Justice alone of its Asset Forfeiture program were $246.5
million).
175. For example, whiskey is sold in state stores in Pennsylvania and Virginia,
private liquor stores in New Jersey, Maryland and the District of Columbia, and
county-run liquor stores in Montgomery County, Maryland. Wine is sold in state
stores in Pennsylvania, private liquor stores in Maryland and Washington, D.C.,
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course, it would take time for the United States to develop a suffi-
ciently comprehensive regulatory scheme for a dozen major classes
of drugs now illegal.
(5) Be comprehensive and consistent among all drugs now legal and
now illegal.
We should focus on the drug "abuse" problem - not just the
"illegal" drug problem. "Illegal" drug use does not exist in legal or
social isolation. Treatment professionals recognize cross-addiction
and poly-drug abuse. Prevention professionals recognize a "gate-
way" relationship between use of legal and illegal drugs. 176
As a result of the inter-relationships between different types of
substance abuse, tightening alcohol and tobacco regulations for
adults as well as children, would help reduce the use and abuse of
other drugs as well. Specifically, the United States could delay the
onset of teen alcohol and tobacco use, which would delay the onset
of other drug use, by controlling the promotion and availability of
tobacco and alcohol to children.
(6) Adopt a public health approach.
The United States needs to adopt a public health - not crimi-
nal - approach toward all drugs and drug users. Sensible drug
policy should include expanded and honest anti-drug education,
because honest comprehensive prevention programs work. Accord-
ing to the United States Surgeon General, cigarettes are as addic-
tive as heroin or cocaine. 177 However, forty-four million cigarette
smokers have quit smoking. 178 A massive public health campaign
has succeeded without jailing or urine-testing cigarette smokers;1 79
all despite billions of dollars of tobacco-use promotion annually.' 80
As part of a public health approach to drug use, quality medi-
and supermarkets in Virginia. Beer is sold in packages in taverns and wholesalers
in Pennsylvania, in private liquor stores and small "delis" in Maryland and Wash-
ington, D.C., and in supermarkets in Virginia.
176. SUBSTANCE ABUSE, supra note 171, at 22.
177. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES
OF SMOKING: NICOTINE ADDICTION, A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL Vi (1988)
(showing that cigarettes and other forms of tobacco are addicting in same sense as
drugs such as heroin and cocaine); see generally ERICH GOODE, DRUGS IN AMERICAN
SOCIETY 255-62 (1993).
178. SUBSTANCE ABUSE, supra note 171, at 28.
179. Id. at 28, 54. Forty-two percent of the U.S. population smoked cigarettes
in 1965, which amounted to 4,345 cigarettes per adult per year. Id. at 12. By 1992,
only 26% of the population smoked, and per capita consumption dropped to
2,629 cigarettes per year. Id.
180. See Carl E. Bartecchi et al., The Global Tobacco Epidemic, ScI. AM., May
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cal care and drug abuse treatment should be easily available for
heroin and crack addicts, the mentally ill, the homeless, the unin-
sured and for everyone at risk of catching or spreading contagious
diseases. This would simultaneously help to halt the transmission
of-disease and reduce the use of illegal drugs as pain killers for
untreated disease.
Further, to stop the spread of blood borne disease among in-
jecting drugs addicts, clean needles should be exchanged for used
ones. Presently, distribution of hypodermic syringes without a pre-
scription is a crime in nine states and the District of Columbia.181
These laws should be repealed. Thirty years ago, distribution of
condoms to teenagers was unthinkable, as was the sale of condoms
in supermarkets and convenience stores. With Griswold v. Connecti-
cut'8 2 in 1965, the United States Supreme Court opened the door
for distribution of condoms.183 Now, for the widely-accepted public
health purpose of fighting sexually transmitted disease, condoms
are widely and freely distributed.
Finally, as part of a public health approach to drug use, treat-
ments like Nicorette® gum which enable cigarette addicts to more
easily break their addiction should be cheaper and more freely
available. After all, cigarettes are only crude, disposable ingestion
devices (and therefore of the most dangerous kind) for the drug
nicotine.184
(7) Remember that the purpose of drug policy is to help people, not hurt
them.
We should not demonize those with drug problems, as they are
usually in some kind of pain. Addicts should not be excluded from
society as Old Testament lepers were. 18 5 Let us be compassion-
ate. 186 Heroin addicts who won't quit ought to be able to get clean,
affordable opiates to prevent crime and disease - without, of
1995, at 47 (finding that United State tobacco industry spent more than $5 billion
on advertising in 1992).
181. George Judson, Study Finds AIDS Risk to Addicts Drops if Sale of Syringes is
Legal, N.Y. TmEs, Aug. 30, 1995, at Al. Syringe possession is illegal in states "with
the most drug users and highest incidence of AIDS among them: California, New
York, New Jersey, Illinois, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts." Id.
182. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
183. Id. at 485 (holding that it is unconstitutional for states to prohibit use of
condoms by married couples).
184. Cigarettes are a "nicotine delivery system," according to a Philip Morris
Company's draft report. Alix M. Friedman, Philip Morris Likens Nicotine to Cocaine,
WALL. ST. J., Dec. 8, 1995, at B1.
185. See Leviticus 13:45-46.
186. See Matthew 10:8 (enjoining of Jesus' disciples to "cleanse lepers"); Luke
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course, disregarding the user accountability principle.187
When addicts "get clean," society as a whole benefits. Anyone
who wants to quit using drugs should be able to receive appropriate
publicly-funded treatment.188 Addicted single parents need resi-
dential treatment that will not break up families.' 8 9 Pregnant ad-
dicts especially need treatment, not imprisonment.190 Today,
however, most treatment programs will not accept pregnant ad-
dicts.1 91 Similarly, HIV-positive addicts should be the top priority
for treatment, yet currently many programs will not take HIV-posi-
tive people. All drug-addicted prisoners should get treatment, but
no one should be prosecuted or imprisoned simply to get
treatment.
5:12-13 (recounting one of Jesus' works on Earth as healing leper by touching
him).
187. For a discussion of the user accountability principle, see supra note 164
and accompanying text.
188. See NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO,
EVALUATING RECOVERY SERVICES: THE CALIFORNIA DRUG AND ALCOHOL TREATMENT
ASSESSMENT (CALDATA) 3 (1994). The cost of treating approximately 150,000
persons for drug and alcohol abuse in 1992 was $209 million, while the benefits
received during treatment and in the first year afterwards were worth approxi-
mately $1.5 billion in savings to taxpaying citizens, due mostly to reductions in
crime. Id. Each day of treatment paid for itself (the benefits to taxpaying citizens
equaled or exceeded the costs) on the day it was received, primarily through an
avoidance of crime. Id. Reported hospitalizations decreased by approximately
one-third from before treatment to after treatment. Id. Treatment for problems
with the major stimulant drugs (crack cocaine, powder cocaine and
methamphetamine) was found to be just as effective as treatment for alcohol
problems and somewhat more effective that treatment for heroin problems. Id.;
see Sheryl Stolberg, Drug Treatment Saves $1.5 Billion, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 29, 1994, at
A3 (reporting that cost of crimes tied to group in treatment dropped by $1 billion
within 15 months after treatment).
189. See Judy Licht, Pregnant Addicts: A Call for Treatment, Not Punishment,
WASH. POST, June 29, 1993 (Health Section), at 13 ("The average woman seeking
help with a substance abuse problem is 27 years old and has three or four other
children.").
190. Offer Treatment, Not Fear of Prosecution, AM. MED. NEWS, Sept. 7, 1992 (Edi-
torial), at 21 (finding that at least 165 women across nation were criminally
charged for exposing their fetuses or infants to exposed substances).
191. See Kathleen Teltsch, In Detroit, A Drug Recovery Center That Welcomes the
Pregnant Addict, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1990, at A13. Pregnant addicts are "the client
nobody wants," according to BeverlyJ. Chisolm, the director of the Eleonore Hut-
zel Recovery Center in Detroit. Id. In New York city, a city of 78 drug treatment
centers found that 87% exclude pregnant users of crack. Id.. Pregnant addicts of
any color are likely to get "runaround" if they seek help. Robert Zimmerman, Try
Intervention for Addicted Mothers, SAN DIEGO UNION, June 16, 1991, at C5. According
to Dr. Loretta Finnegan, a senior adviser on women's issues to the National Insti-
tute on Drug Abuse, "[t] he alcohol and drug treatment people will tell her they
don't know anything about pregnancy, so go to an obstetrician. The obstetricians
tell her they don't know anything about substance abuse, so go to a treatment
program." Id.
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Many currently prohibited drugs could be used to help people.
Marijuana has medical uses. 192 Heroin relieves pain for some peo-
ple who obtain no relief from other drugs. 193 Those who can bene-
fit from either of these drugs should be able to get it legally from
their doctors.194 This doesn't mean these drugs are "good" or "bet-
ter" than other drugs, but that they are useful for some people.
Those who can benefit from drugs should not be denied them
because medical use of these drugs allegedly sends the "wrong
message." First, drug users are not listening for the message. Co-
caine, Valium® and Dilaudid® have uses in medicine, but the ad-
dicts who abuse those drugs do not care. Second, there is not a
single good value for our children, such as honesty, thrift, industry,
chastity, responsibility, moderation or non-violence, that is not con-
stantly bombarded by conflicting messages. Despite this, teenagers
everyday successfully sort out the conflicting messages. Exaggerat-
ing the dangers of wrong messages when it comes to drugs is
irrational.
(8) Maximize the reach of the law and respect for the law.
Drug and alcohol buyers should not purchase from criminals.
Criminals may not legally sell alcohol now,195 and they should not
be allowed to sell other drugs either. Marijuana, the most widely
consumed illegal drug, should be taxed and sold to adults with
warning messages but without the pernicious effects of unbridled
advertising permitted by alcohol and tobacco, companies.1 96
Ending exclusive control of drug sales by criminals would keep
the tens of billions of dollars in annual profits away from organized
crime. 197 Today, growing one's own marijuana is a felony' 98 for
192. Lester Grinspoon & James B. Bakalar, Marihuana as Medicine: A Plea for
Reconsideration, 273 JAMA 23, 1875, 1876 (1995) (affirming that marijuana is medi-
cally useful); see also LESTER GINSPOON, M.D., & JAMES B. BAKALAR, J.D., MARI-
HUANA: THE FORBIDDEN MEDICINE (1993) (discussing marijuana's historical and
possible future uses in medical field).
193. TREBACH, THE HEROIN SOLUTION, supra note 5, at 59-84.
194. See generally 130 CONG. REc. S26,063-96 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1984) (debate
on the Compassionate Pain Relief Act, H.R. 5290).
195. See 26 U.S.C. § 5551(b)(1)-(2) (1988) (stating that a person who has
been convicted of "any felony under a law of any state" cannot receive authority to
sell alcohol legally).
196. For a discussion of advertising for the tobacco industry, see supra note
180 and accompanying text.
197. For a further discussion of the annual profits of the drug business in the
United States, see supra note 174 and accompanying text.
198. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (1988) (providing that anyone who manufac-
tures (which is defined to include cultivation) marijuana without authorization is
19951
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which the government may seize one's home or land.1 99 As a result,
every marijuana user today has great incentive to patronize
criminals. Perhaps the United States should encourage home culti-
vation for personal use to reduce commercial opportunities for
criminals.
It is important to note that few police officers or revenue
agents are killed or injured enforcing the liquor laws.200 It seems
logical, therefore, to assume that we would not be similarly jeopard-
izing the lives of government employees by adopting a policy of
management and regulation of the drug trade.
(9) Respect other peoples, other cultures and other nations.
It is irresponsible for the United States to blame other coun-
tries for its drug problems and useless for the United States to in-
timidate minority groups such as Latin-Americans or Asian-
Americans. Calling peyote use by members of the Native American
Church "drug use" is like calling Catholic consumption of sacra-
mental wine at Communion drug use.201 There is no peyote abuse
problem destroying American youth or cities to justify its differenti-
ation. 20 2 Indians in Peru and Bolivia chew coca leaf, and profes-
sionals drink coca tea: these are both harmless practices. It makes
no sense for coca users in Peru and Bolivia to be considered inter-
national outlaws in violation of the Single Convention on Narcot-
ics. 20 3 The United States should recognize that some harmless
subject to imprisonment, depending on quantity, from five years to life
imprisonment).
199. 21 U.S.C. § 881 (1988) (providing that "[tlhe following shall be subject
to forfeiture .... [ajll real property, including any right, title, and interest ...
which is used, or intended to be used ... to commit, or to facilitate the commis-
sion of, a violation of this subchapter.").
200. BuREAu OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 159, at 401 tbl. 3.154 (listing
law enforcement officers killed from 1978-1992 under different circumstances at
the scene of incident and showing no officers killed while enforcing liquor laws).
201. The Supreme Court upheld the disqualification of a member of the Na-
tive American Church from receiving unemployment compensation, having been
discharged from employment in a drug treatment program for failing to be "drug-
free" because he took peyote, the sacrament of his church. See Employment Div. v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
202. The American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994, Pub.
L. No. 103-344, 108 Stat. 3125 (1994), protects the use, possession and transporta-
tion of peyote by an "Indian for bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in con-
nection with the practice of a traditional Indian religion" from any prohibitions by
Federal or State law. Id. Congress found that "for many Indian people, the tradi-
tional ceremonial use of the peyote cactus as a religious sacrament has for centu-
ries been integral to a way of life, and significant in perpetuating Indian tribes and
cultures." See 42 U.S.C. § 1996a(a) (1994).
203. Article 26 of the Single Convention on Narcotics permits cultivation of
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practices are the business of other societies and not of ours.
(10) Recognize that drugs are a major commodity in international
trade.204
Drugs have been a major commodity in international trade
since tobacco, coffee, tea, chocolate and spices were introduced to
Europe centuries ago. 20 5 A ban has not stopped - and cannot
stop - this trade. Instead of trying to enforce a useless ban, the
United States needs to take control of this enormous trade away
from criminals and corrupt customs officials, by regulating and tax-
ing it.
Simultaneously, the United States needs to renounce increas-
ing cigarette exports as a major objective of trade policy.20 6 It is
criminal and immoral to push an addictive drug on others. By
pushing tobacco use, America acts similarly to Great Britain when it
forced China to accept Indian opium in the nineteenth century.
(11) Be creative and flexible to meet our goals.
Through regulation, we must encourage means of drug admin-
istration that are less harmful as well as easier to control physically,
socially, culturally and legally. We must be wary of more harmful or
harder-to-control means. For example, we might concentrate on
trying to limit the smoking of drugs such as nicotine, cocaine, her-
oin and marijuana, because smoking gives intense "rushes" but is
more harmful and harder to control than other forms of ingestion.
the coca bush only under regulation. Illegally cultivated coca bushes must be de-
stroyed. Article 27 permits the continued use of coca leaves for the preparation of
a flavouring agent, which shall not contain any alkaloids (i.e. cocaine). Article 49
provides for certain transitional reservations for coca leaf chewing, but paragraph
2(e) requires that coca chewing must be abolished within 25 years of the effective
date of the Single Convention under Article 41. The Convention became effective
on December 13, 1964. Thus, on December 13, 1989, coca chewing in Peru ceased
to be legal under the Single Convention on Narcotics. United Nations Commentary
on the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961, U.N. Doc. (1973).
204. See Terry Atlas, Shultz Asks Nigerians to Halt Drug Trade, Cm. TRIB., Jan. 13,
1987, at C12 (recognizing that "[t]he drug business is creating a new generation of
millionaires here who have turned this city's international airport into an active
transshipment point for heroin coming to the United States from Pakistan, India
and Southeast Asia"); Santa Marta's Dollar-Spinning Grass, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 9,
1978, at 75 (stating that "[t]he huge fortunes made by the successful [Colombian
drug producers] ensure that there is no shortage of recruits to the drug business").
205. OAKLEY RAY & CHARLES KSIR, DRUGS, SOCIETY, & HUMAN BEHAVIOR 215-23
(5th ed. 1990); see also GOODE, supra note 177, at 255-62 (describing tobacco as
potent drug).
206. See GOODE, supra note 177, at 257 ("Marlboro, the most popular cigarette
brand in the world, now sells more cigarettes abroad than in the United States.").
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At the same time, oral ingestion of coca leaf and cannabis prepara-
tions are less intense, habit-forming and harmful.20 7 Perhaps we
could encourage oral ingestion as an alternative when appropriate.
(12) Reduce the intensity of all drug messages.
Drugs should neither be promoted nor hysterically attacked.
We should prevent drug advertising from being aimed at youth.
Drugs should not be advertised, for example, via "Spuds MacKen-
zie" (the dog promoting Bud Light® beer) or Camel cigarette's
'Joe Camel" character.20 8
At the same time, anti-drug messages should be kept reason-
able and truthful. The famous television public service announce-
ment which states "This is your brain; this is your brain on drugs:
any questions?" and features frying eggs in a skillet certainly at-
tracted attention, but it was also ludicrous and misleading. It in-
vited contempt from the people it was supposed to positively
influence. Marijuana users are associated with a greater tolerance
for deviance; they may also have a greater inclination toward risk-
taking, and transgression. 20 9 To bombard children with the
message that "the most important thing in the world is that you
should not do drugs" could end up only serving as an enticement.
VII. CONCLUSION
No matter what we do, drug use and drug abuse will continue.
As a result, a prohibition-based drug policy cannot succeed in fun-
damentally reducing use or reducing the collateral harms from pro-
hibition. It is time to recognize that prohibition of drugs in the
United States has failed and begin to implement a new approach to
control drug use.
If it establishes a new drug policy, the United States could ame-
liorate some of the problems which have arisen out of prohibition.
By continuing to think about drug use as a moral crusade and by
maintaining prohibition, the United States has exempted the drug
207. RAY & KsIR, supra note 205, at 127, 335.
208. "In 1988, RJ. Reynolds fashioned 'Old Joe Camel,' a cartoon character
who shoots pool, rides motorcycles and associates with attractive women as he
smokes cigarettes. Three years after the campaign began.., one study showed six-
year-olds knew the character as often as they picked out Mickey Mouse. Teenagers
were likewise influenced. Surveys done in 1988 and 1990 show that the proportion
of teenage smokers who bought the Camel brand increased from 0.5% to 32%. In
this same period, it is estimated that Camel cigarette sales to minors soared from
$6 million to $476 million." Bartecchi et al., supra note 180 at 47.
209. GOODE, supra note 177, at 193.
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trade from any regulation and control. This, in turn, has maxi-
mized the violence and disease associated with drugs. In addition,
by keeping drugs inordinately profitable, the government has con-
tinuously tempted people to sell them for easy money. In the end,
our country should not "legalize" drugs for legalization's sake;
rather, we should do so because legalized drug markets are more
easily and effectively controlled, regulated and policed.
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